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Abstract
This research is designed to investigate the contextual components utilized to convey
sarcastic verbal irony, testing whether theoretical components deemed as necessary for
creating a sense of irony are, in fact, necessary. A novel task was employed: Given a set of
statements that out-of-context were not rated as sarcastic, participants were instructed to
either generate discourse context that would make the statements sarcastic or meaningful
(without further specification). In a series of studies these generated contexts were shown to
differ from one another along the dimensions presumed as necessary (failed expectation,
pragmatic insincerity, negative tension and presence of a victim) and along stylistic
components (as indexed by the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count or LIWC). However, none of
these components were found to be necessary. Indeed in each case the items rated as highest
in sarcasm were often at the lowest levels on the putative “necessary” characteristic.
The ratings were then used to develop an online reading task to investigate the effect of
negative tension on the processing of sarcastic and literal statements. Three groups of items
were taken from the previous studies to form high negative tension; low negative tension;
and literal statements. Reading times for seven key areas were compared across the three
groups and it was found that in two of the critical areas, the low negative items were
processed significantly more slowly than the other two sets of items. The literal and high
negative items however did not differ significantly in their processing times. These findings
support the predictions of direct access models and contradict the predictions of the standard
pragmatic model of language processing. The findings from the studies are seen as
consistent with constraint satisfaction models of sarcasm processing in which various
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linguistic and extralinguistic information provide probabilistic (but not necessary) support for
or against a sarcastic interpretation.

Keywords: sarcasm, irony, implicit display model, allusional pretense model, pragmatics,
psycholinguistics, online processing, figurative language
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, irony has been increasingly studied by researchers in
many disciplines (Gibbs & Colston, 2007). The focus of this paper will be limited to
the form of irony known as verbal irony, a figure of speech in which the meaning that
is communicated is the opposite of the meaning that would be communicated if used
literally. In other words, when referring to verbal irony generally one is describing a
linguistic expression that is the contrary to the reality that is being experienced, or at
least it is comprehended as a dismissal of the position being expressed (Katz, 2008).
For example if someone says, “Nice hair” to someone who has just received a
horrible haircut, therefore intending to express, “Bad hair”, then this comment would
be considered verbal irony (Gibbs & Colston, 2007).
Researchers over the years have proposed that sarcasm is a variant of verbal
irony (Colston, 2000; Lee & Katz, 1998) and the emphasis in this paper will be
sarcastic verbal irony. Sarcastic verbal irony is seen by many as having the
characteristics of verbal irony with the addition of the existence of a victim (Lee &
Katz, 1998). In their studies of verbal irony, many researchers have in fact asked
participants to give ratings of sarcasm and not irony per se. (e.g., Colston, 2000).
Moreover, Gibbs (1994) provides an inclusive examination of the psychological
literature dealing with figurative language and finds that sarcasm is treated
interchangeably with verbal irony. In this investigation we will examine the
contextual characteristics of sarcastic verbal irony, rather than simply verbal irony.
More specifically, the paper focuses on the discourse context necessary to initiate
comprehension of sarcastic verbal irony.
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One of the reasons that sarcasm has been of interest to a variety of
researchers, ranging from philosophers, linguists and cognitive psychologists is
because of the challenge it poses to those trying to develop a comprehensive theory of
language comprehension (Colston, 2000), especially given the frequency of its usage.
In sarcastic verbal irony one asserts a statement that expresses something that is
contrary to reality but, does so with the expectation that the utterance will be
understood. This contradiction poses a theoretical difficulty: How do people
understand such comments when there is a mismatch between the intended (speaker)
meaning and the meaning of the words being used (utterance meaning). This
difficulty is compounded because the utterance meaning on the surface can, in
principle, be a mismatch with intended meaning.
Given that there is a mismatch between the speaker meaning and the utterance
meaning, additional information or conditions would seem necessary in order to
successfully convey the desired sarcastic intent. One source of this additional
information or condition(s) is, arguably, found in the discourse context within which
the statement is embedded. In essence, the question studied here will be whether
there are necessary conditions found within the contextual discourse information that
initiates successful comprehension of sarcastic verbal irony. That is, can we identify
characteristics which define an ironic/sarcastic context or ironic/sarcastic
environment in the preceding discourse that initiates a sarcastic verbal irony
understanding?
Several researchers have put forth theories pertaining to verbal irony
comprehension relevant to the question addressed here. (e.g., Giora, 2003; Kumon-

3

Nakamura, Glucksberg & Brown., 1995; Utsumi, 2000). Contained within these
theories, the researchers make claims (implicitly or directly) regarding the conditions
that must be present in order for sarcastic irony comprehension to successfully take
place (Gibbs & Colston, 2007). The following section reviews these theories.

Review of Verbal Irony/Sarcasm Theories

Allusional Pretense Theory
According to the allusional pretense theory the necessary conditions to elicit
conversational irony are allusion to failed expectations and pragmatic insincerity
(Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg & Brown, 1995). These are conditions that, according to
the theory, must be present within the greater contextual information provided in order to
achieve the desired understanding of the ironic utterance.
An allusion to failed expectation refers to a discrepancy between a certain
expectation and the reality that actually occurs at a later time (Kumon-Nakamura et al.,
1995). If we consider the example given earlier of the individual stating “Nice hair!” to
someone who has just received a bad haircut, the expectation is that people want to get
“good” haircuts when they visit the barber/hairstylist and the reality is that the individual
on this occasion did not receive a “good” haircut. By stating “Nice hair” to this
individual then, the speaker is alluding to the failed expectation that the individual had
desired a good haircut but in reality did not get what they were expecting. This would be
an example of an implicit allusion to failed expectations in that the expectation for a good
haircut was assumed, as a social norm, to be the desired outcome. If the context
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contained within it a statement such as “I am going to get my haircut today and it is
going to be a great haircut”, then the ironic utterance of “Nice hair” would be considered
as an explicit allusion to failed expectation (Colston, 2000).
The second necessary component proposed by Kumon-Nakamura et al.
(1995) is pragmatic insincerity, in which the speaker does not sincerely intend to
communicate what his or her utterance is generally supposed to imply (Colston,
2000). This characteristic follows from the felicity condition, as originally discussed
by Austin (1962) and later elaborated on by Searle (1979; see Colston, 2000): an
assumption that a speaker, when performing a well-formed speech act, is being
truthful or sincere in what they are saying (sincerity condition). Looking again at our
“Nice hair” example, according to the sincerity condition of a well formed speech act,
when the speaker states “nice hair” there is an assumption that he or she means that
they believe the individual received a nice haircut. However, when being ironic, the
individual is not intending the compliment and therefore they are being insincere. The
insincerity is described as pragmatic because it does not apply to the semantic
properties of an utterance, but instead applies to how the language is used (i.e., the
pragmatic level) (Colston, 2000). To recap, according to the allusional pretense
theory two necessary conditions for the interpretation of verbal irony are the presence
of an allusion to failed expectations (implicit or explicit) and pragmatic insincerity on
the part of the speaker.
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Implicit Display Model (Utsumi, 2000)
A more recent theoretical approach, implicit display theory (Utsumi, 2000),
provides an additional contextual constraint. Utsumi (2000) proposes a theory of
verbal irony called the Implicit Display Model. According to the implicit display
model an utterance of verbal irony implicitly displays an ironic environment and it is
proposed that verbal irony is a prototype-based category (Utsumi, 2000). The claim
by the implicit display model is that the identification of the ironic environment is
done by “checking or inferring its constituent events/states” (Utsumi, 2000, pp.
1781).
According to implicit display theory, if a statement is going to be interpreted as
ironic, it must be identified as coming from or being embedded within an ironic
environment. Utsumi argues the ironic environment consists of three events:
1. The speaker has a certain expectation (E) at time (t).
2. The speaker’s expectation (E) fails.
3. The speaker has a negative emotional attitude toward the incongruity between
what is expected and what actually is the case.
If the accompanying discourse context contains these conditions then the situation is
surrounded by an ironic environment (Utsumi, 2000). It is necessary, according to
the implicit display theory, that for a statement to be considered sarcastic/ironic it has
to be contained within such an environment (Utsumi, 2000).

6

The second key aspect proposed by the implicit display theory is that an ironic
communication presumes the implicit display of an ironic environment. This is
accomplished when an utterance:
1. “Alludes to the speaker’s expectation (E)
2. Includes pragmatic insincerity by intentionally violating one of the pragmatic
principles, and
3. Expresses indirectly the speaker’s negative attitude toward the failure of (E)”
(Utsumi, 2000, pp.1785).
Implicit display theory attempts to describe the comprehension of sarcasm/irony
by way of prototype category initiation. More specifically, according to implicit
display theory, we interpret sarcasm/irony by recognizing the statement as belonging
to or being imbedded within an environment that initiates the category of irony or
sarcasm. The key claim of the implicit display theory, for the purposes of this thesis,
is that in order for a statement to be seen or recognized as ironic, the surrounding
environment or context should contain the particular cues that create the ironic
context, which according to the theory are allusion to a failed expectation and
negative tension. It should be noted that Utsumi (2000) is a theoretical article and no
empirical support for his proposals is provided. One aim of the studies completed
here is to subject his theory to empirical testing.
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Presence of a Victim
Dictionaries often define sarcasm as stating the opposite of an intended meaning
especially in order to insult or mock a person, situation or thing. In other words, sarcasm
is often defined as irony with a victim (Jorgensen, 1996). Indeed, Lee and Katz (1998)
claims that sarcastic discourse requires the ridicule of a victim to distinguish it from
ironic discourse. There is a limited literature on the necessity for sarcasm to have a
victim or specific target of the barb.
Lee and Katz (1998) presented to participants various comments in which
sarcasm was presented within a discourse context. Of importance here, the passages
varied on the presence or absence of a specific victim of ridicule, and the participants
were asked to provide a rating of the target sarcasm on how good an example of sarcasm
it is. The ratings were provided on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very poor example) to
7 (very good example). In Experiment 1, Lee and Katz found that the manipulation of a
victim accounted for more than 35% of the variance in the degree of sarcasm conveyed
while in Experiment 2 the ridicule accounted for 38% of the variance in the degree of
sarcasm conveyed (Lee & Katz, 1998). Thus both experiments show a similar pattern in
that the presence of ridicule aimed at a specific victim plays a significant role in
conveying sarcasm.
A subsequent experiment, by Toplak and Katz (2000), attempted to identify
characteristics that made the victim salient to a sense of sarcasm. In this study
participants again read target sentences embedded within a discourse context in which the
target was a negative comment expressed indirectly through sarcasm or as a direct
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criticism. Of most importance, participants were asked to consider the statements from a
specific perspective: either as the person who uttered the negative comment, as the target
of the barb or as a neutral over-hearer. A fourth group was not given any perspective
information. Each participant rated the target comment along a set of dimensions chosen
to tap speaker intent and impact.
The relevant results of Toplak and Katz is that, relative to a direct criticism, the
“person who utters an indirect, sarcastic statement is perceived as intending to be more
offensive, verbally aggressive, anger-provoking, and mocking. The sarcastic message is
also perceived as more insincere, humorous, impolite, non-instructional, and conveying a
somewhat unclear message” (pp. 1470-71). Basically, sarcasm was perceived as a means
of verbal aggression. There was an interesting difference amongst those who took on the
varying perspectives of speaker, recipient or over-hearer of the barb. Inasmuch as the
speaker perceived his/her comments more positively than people with differing
perspectives. The speaker felt relatively less negative and aggressive, while people
taking other viewpoints saw them more so.
Despite the differences noted above, there were no systematic differences in the
type of intentions perceived by speaker and victim. Both groups saw sarcasm as a more
negative form of criticism than when it is expressed directly, and both groups showed the
same overall profile of intentions as being involved. The difference was, as noted above,
the speaker perceived less overall negativity in the comment than did the victim.
In summary, the theories reviewed here would argue that a sense of sarcastic
irony to a statement involves a discourse context or environment that possesses all or
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some of the following: a sense of (or allusion to) failed expectation, pragmatic
insincerity, negative tension and presence of a victim.
Empirical Investigations of the Necessary Components of Sarcastic Irony
To our knowledge, there is only one study that has focused on identifying the
necessary components of sarcastic verbal irony mentioned above, namely a paper by
Herbert Colston (2000). Colston investigated two necessary conditions for verbal
irony that were proposed by theories of verbal irony comprehension (e.g. KumonNakamura et al., 1995; Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989). The two necessary conditions
were allusion to violated expectations and pragmatic insincerity. In his article,
Colston (2000) experimentally investigated the necessity of these two conditions in
sarcastic verbal irony.
The first condition, allusion to violated expectations, as mentioned earlier,
refers to the concept that the speaker of the sarcastic verbal irony must in their
comment refer to a prior prediction, expectation, preference, previously made
comment or social norm that during the ensuing events was violated. The
mechanisms for achieving an allusion to violated expectations in verbal irony are
echoic mention, echoic reminder, elicitation, true assertion and pretense. All of these
examples have the common characteristic of illuminating some expectation, desire,
social norm etc. that was not achieved. As a result Kuman-Nakamura et al. (1995)
used the broad term allusional pretense to describe all of these violated expectations
(Coslton, 2000).
The first set of studies done by Colston (2000) investigated the necessity of the
condition: allusion to violated expectations. In the first study participants were given
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20 different scenarios and asked to rate how sarcastic the speaker was being with his
or her comments. The scale ranged from 1 (not at all sarcastic) to 7 (extremely
sarcastic). Colston judiciously manipulated the content of these scenarios such that
they differed on the nature of the critical “sarcastic” comment (i.e., earnest negative,
echoic, negative jest, and earnest positive). Examples of each comment type as taken
from Colston (2000, pp. 287) follow:
Earnest negative – You and Julie want to go to a concert but neither of you have
enough money for the ticket. She says “This sucks.”
Echoic – You and Julie want to go to concert but neither of you have enough
money for the ticket. She says, “This is great.”
Negative Jest – You and Julie want to go to a concert and you both have enough
money for the ticket. She says, “This sucks.”
Earnest Positive – You and Julie want to go to a concert and you both have
enough money for the ticket. She says, “This is great.”
The main experimental question in the first set of studies by Colston (2000) was to
see if the ironic interpretation of negative jest involves the interpreter of the comment
to infer a violated negative expectation.
Through the sarcasm ratings of the participants, Colston (2000) found that the
negative jest scenarios were rated almost as sarcastic as the echoic scenarios (means
of 5.11 and 5.62 respectively). It was presumed by Colston that the interpretation of
verbal irony relies upon some allusion to failed expectations. When one gives
positive assertions about negative situations this achieves an allusion to failed
expectation by echoing commonly recognized social norms (Colston, 2000). Colston
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claims that this is why echoic comments would be rated as more sarcastic than the
earnest comments. Colston, basing his predictions upon the findings of Kruez and
Glucksberg (1989), predicted that the negative jests would be rated as sarcastic but
not to the level of the echoic comments. However, both the negative jest and the
echoic comments were expected to be rated as more sarcastic than the earnest
comments. Colston’s findings supported this prediction.
Once it was established that the negative jest scenarios were seen as sarcastic by
the participants, Colston (2000) set out to experimentally test to see if the negative
jest scenarios were seen to include an allusion to violated expectations. Colston
(2000) did so by using the same scenarios as the previous study. However, instead of
asking participants to rate the level of sarcasm, they were asked to rate the degree to
which each speaker expected the situation that they encountered.
The logic behind this being that, according to Colston (2000), if the interpreter
does not infer some level of failed expectations, then the previous claim that sarcastic
verbal irony has a necessary condition of allusion to violated expectations would need
revision. In other words, according to Colston, if a listener is able to successfully
interpret sarcastic verbal irony in an utterance without detecting an allusion to failed
expectation within the surrounding environment, then the allusion to failed
expectation claim being necessary for such interpretations would have to be revisited.
The findings from the rating of expectedness did however reveal that the
speakers were in fact surprised by the events in the scenarios (Colston, 2000). In
other words, the ratings supported the notion that the speaker was not expecting the
events that occurred in the scenarios. This result, combined with the finding that the
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negative jest (and echoic) scenarios were also rated as sarcastic, supports the
proposition that allusion to violated expectations is a necessary condition in sarcastic
verbal irony comprehension according to Colston (2000).
The second condition investigated by Colston (2000) was pragmatic
insincerity. Kumon-Namamura et al. (1995) developed the term pragmatic insincerity
to account for utterances that do not appear insincere on a propositional level, but do
seem to be insincere on a speech act level. In other words, the utterance is spoken as
and presented as if it is a sincere comment, however it is intended as an insincere
comment and the speaker is not making a truthful statement. In the second set of
experiments by Colston (2000), he investigated this condition of pragmatic insincerity
by testing to see if pragmatically sincere comments would be interpreted
sarcastically. Colston asked participants to rate the degree of sarcasm they perceived
in pragmatically insincere, pragmatically sincere, and earnest comments within 16
scenarios. The idea behind this study was that if participants only rated the
pragmatically insincere comments as sarcastic, it would support the proposal of
pragmatic insincerity as being a necessary condition of sarcastic verbal irony.
However, if participants rated the pragmatically sincere items as sarcastic, then this
would not support that notion (Colston, 2000). The following are examples of each
type of item used; taken from Colston, 2000, pp. 117:
Item Examples:
Pragmatic Insincere: Margaret was a very prim and proper person and she
appreciated good table manners. You and she were having lunch once, when a man
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at an adjacent table let out a very loud belch. Margaret said to the man, “I love when
people belch at the table.”
Pragmatic Sincere: Margaret was a very prim and proper person and she
appreciated good table manners. You and she were having lunch once, when a man
at an adjacent table let out a very loud belch. Margaret said to the man, “I love when
people don’t belch at the table.”
Earnest: Margaret was a very prim and proper person and she appreciated good
table manners. You and she were having lunch once, when a man at an adjacent table
let out a very loud belch. Margaret said to the man, “I hate when people belch at the
table.”
Colston found no significant difference in the level of rated sarcasm between
the rating of the pragmatically insincere items and the pragmatically sincere items. In
other words, the items in which the speaker was making a truthful statement at the
propositional level (I love when people don’t belch at the table) were rated just as
sarcastic as the items in which the speaker was giving an insincere statement (I love
when people belch at the table). This result indicates, according to Colston (2000),
that the condition of pragmatic insincerity may not actually be necessary for the
successful comprehension of sarcastic verbal irony.
Summary
The major purpose of the preceding section was to give an overview of the
proposed necessary conditions that lead to comprehension of sarcastic verbal irony.
In reviewing the theories, four conditions have been identified; negative tension,
allusion to failed expectations, pragmatic insincerity, and presence of a victim.
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Current Research
The goal of the studies conducted and proposed to be conducted is to further the
investigation of the necessary conditions for the successful comprehension of a
sarcastic/ironic utterance and their impact on the processing of sarcastic utterances.
One of the ways that this investigation into the topic will differ from those of the past
is the experimental task utilized in the main study. In previous research investigating
verbal sarcastic/ironic statements, items were created, presented in reading tasks in
which participants then rated level of sarcasm or some other dependent variable (e.g.
Colston, 2000; Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg & Brown, 1995). In other words, the
context and the target statements embedded within those contexts were created and
developed by the researchers beforehand.
One of the goals of this research is to present a task that enables the participants
themselves to come up with the contextual components necessary to convey verbal
sarcasm/irony. This novel task allows participants the freedom to put into a generated
context what they see as sufficient and necessary characteristics to convey an
understandable sarcastic utterance. In other words, the task used in the first study of
this research will not be restricted by the researchers predetermining the sarcastic
contexts, but rather give participants the opportunity to include the contextual
conditions they would deem must be present to understand an utterance as being
sarcastic. These generated contexts will then be investigated in subsequent studies
presented here by subjective ratings, and objective analysis of the lexical items.
Finally, a subset will be employed in an online reading task. The aims are twofold.
The first will be to test which, if any putative components are necessary for creating a
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sense of sarcastic irony, and second to test whether specific theoretical proposals can
be supported.
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CHAPTER TWO: EMPERICALLY IDENTIFYING THE
COMPONENTS OF GENERATED CONTEXTS
Traditionally, research investigating sarcastic verbal irony has consisted of
providing participants with pre-written and controlled texts - controlled in the sense
that researchers manipulate the presence or absence of certain features they deem
important. These techniques have proven useful in examining selected theoretical
questions. However, the use of pre-determined text also presupposes that these texts
contain the characteristics of sarcastic irony without subjecting that presupposition to
empirical testing. In the novel task used here, participants are asked to generate a
discourse context that they believe would lead to a sarcastic reading. From the
perspective taken here, these generated contexts can be analyzed to see what
components are actually used to signal sarcastic irony and to answer the following
question: Are there features added to context that invite a sarcastic interpretation? Are
any such features necessary to create that sense of sarcasm?
The data generation steps employed here are as follows. The first step to
develop this task is to gather a set of target utterances that one can subsequently use
in a context generation task. In this step the aim is to identify items that, out-of
context, would be either unlikely to be seen as sarcastic or conversely, be commonly
read as sarcastic. Once a set of appropriate items are identified, the next step will be
to include the items in a context generation task. The results of the context generation
task will then be analyzed to determine if participants include in their generated
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contexts the components of discourse context deemed to be necessary by the existing
and previously defined theories. More specifically, the components are allusion to
failed expectation; pragmatic insincerity; negative tension; and the presence of a
victim. The contexts created will be analyzed using both subjective (coded and rating
measures) as well as objective (Linguistic Inquiry Word Count) measures to
determine if the sarcastic contexts created differ from the literal contexts that are
created.
Creating a set of target items for use in the context generation task
To examine the effect of context on the level of sarcastic verbal irony, one
requires a set of items for out-of-context occurrence that is perceived as neither
conventionally sarcastic nor non-sarcastic when used as a sarcastic utterance. That is,
the ideal situation would be for the target sentences to fall in the mid-range of a
conventionality sarcasm-rating scale and could, thus, be biased towards a literal or
ironic use by the nature of the discourse context. Consequently, a set of items were
rated on an 8 point scale in which a score of 0 referred to not conventionally used
sarcastically at all and a score of 7 referred to the item being highly conventionally
used sarcastically. A second rating was also included: Ease of context creation. The
logic for this rating is that if an item is perceived as being too easily put into context it
could be a result of being too strongly associated with a particular sarcastic context
(which could be considered as akin to highly conventional). If an item was
consistently rated as very difficult to place into context, it could be argued that the
item is confusing or too difficult to associate with any sarcastic meaning or context.
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Participants
Eighty-two participants were tested; (45 females); the average age of the
complete sample is 20 years. The participants were undergraduate students enrolled in an
Introductory Psychology course at the University of Western Ontario. The students
received one half-credit (30 minutes) towards their course requirements for their
participation.
Rating Scales, Instructions and Procedure
A set of items were rated on an 8 point scale measuring the degree to which an
item is conventionally understood as sarcastic when out-of-context. A score of 7
represents an item that is highly sarcastic and 1 as not sarcastic at all. Because of the
nature of the main task, a second rating, ease of constructing a context, was also
measured. The ease of constructing a context measure was to measure how difficult or
easy it would be to generate a surrounding context that would allow for the listener to
know the comment was meant as a sarcastic utterance.
Target sentences were collected from previous studies investigating verbal irony
(Colston, 2000; Katz & Pexman, 1997). Examples of these target items are “I did great
on that test.” and “You are in a good mood today.” Twenty-five of these target items, as
well as 10 filler items, were rated using the two scales described above (conventionally
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used as sarcasm, and ease of creating context). The following is an example of the
instructions given:
Your task is to rate the statements in bold italics on the two scales provided. The
first scale is a rating of how often (conventional) the statement is used with a sarcastic
meaning (stating the opposite of what the speaker intends). The second scale is a
measure of how easy it is for you to think of a context or scenario in which the statement
could be used in a sarcastic manner.
“I did great on that test.”
How often is this statement used with a sarcastic intention?
Never
0 1

Always
2

3

4

5

6

7

How easily can you come up with context to make this statement sarcastic?
Very Easy
0 1

2

Very Difficult
3

4 5

6

7

Participants signed up and completed the study online. They were presented the
target sentences with the two rating scales one at a time. Participants worked at their own
pace and, on average, it took approximately 25 minutes to complete the task.
Results
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On the 8-point scales, the average conventionality of sarcasm use ranged from 3.6
to 4.3 and on the ease of constructing a sarcasm context scale from 2.8 to 3.4. The
average ratings did not differ from the mid-point (3.5) of the respective scales, t(81) =
0.088, and t(81) = 0.352, both ps > 0.05 for the sarcasm and ease of constructing a
context. Because the items were at the mid-range of both scales, it was deemed that the
items were neither at ceiling nor basement and hence that the effects of inviting a
sarcastic context could be appropriately studied using this item set.
Experiment 1: Context generation under two instructional sets
The 25 items described above were placed in minimal context, and participants
were asked to construct a more elaborate context making the target sentence be
understood simply as “meaningful” (the Open control condition) or as “sarcastic” (the
Experimental condition). The aim was to see whether the instructional manipulations
led to differences in the nature of the contexts that were produced. In essence, the
aim here was to empirically determine the contextual characteristics that our
participants generated distinguishing sarcastic from non-sarcastic sentences. Analysis
of the control condition will indicate whether some sentences will be used as sarcasm,
even though previously rated as mid-line conventional in sarcastic usage, and even
when participants are not instructed to do so.

Methods
Participants
Eighty-four undergraduate students (54 Females and 30 Males) from the
University of Western Ontario were tested and given 1 credit for their participation;

21

the mean age of the complete sample is 21 years. There were forty-two participants
in each of the two groups (sarcastic instruction and open instruction).

Materials and Procedure
In this study participants were provided, in booklet form, a set of target
sentences. Along with each target sentence presented, there was given a minimal
context. An example of a booklet item looked like this:
_____________________________
Stan and Jennifer had just finished the exam.
_______________________________
Jennifer turns to Stan and says,
“I did great on that test.”
In this example, the target statement is “I did great on that test.” and the
participants were asked to create the necessary context to ensure that the statement
was understood.

The following are the instructions given to participants from the two groups:
A)

Open Instruction Group

In each of the following stories a person says something. Some minimal
context is provided for the conditions or situation in which the statement was made.
Your task is to ADD information to the context so that a naïve reader would
understand exactly why the statement (in italics) was made. For each of the stories
we have added some blank lines. ADD information to any of these blank lines that
you think would make the target statement completely understandable.
B)

Sarcastic Instruction Group
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In each of the following stories a person says something that was meant to be
sarcastic. Some minimal context is provided for the conditions or situation in which
the statement was made. Your task is to ADD information to the context so that a
naïve reader would understand exactly why the statement (in italics) was sarcastically
made. For each of the stories we have added some blank lines. ADD information to
any of these blank lines that you think would make the target statement completely
understandable as a sarcastic comment.
Each booklet contained 25 items (the list is provided in Appendix A).
The study took approximately 45 minutes to complete.
Results
Given that there were 25 items and 42 participants per instructional set, over
1000 contexts were generated for each set. These items were coded for speaker intent
as follows. A coder, blind to the instructional manipulation, was employed to rate
each item. For the initial round of coding the coder was instructed to read each item
(context plus target sentence) and for each of the items determine if the target
sentence was intended as literal or sarcastic (a binary decision). The few items that
were seen as ambiguous by the rater (i.e. neither literal nor sarcastic) were
categorized as “other”. To ensure the reliability of this categorization, a second blind
coder was given 15 booklets (375 generated contexts) from each of the groups to
code, with the same instructions as the initial coder. Almost 95% (94.3%) were
placed in the same categories by the two coders. To reiterate, the coders were not
informed about the instructions given to the participants (sarcastic or open) and were
not told about the goal of the study. Given the high rate of concordance, the data
from the first coder is employed and is depicted in Table 1.
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Table 1
Percentage of Items from both Instruction Groups (Open Instruction and Sarcastic
Instruction) Classified into Each Category (Sarcastic; Literal; Other)
Sarcastic

Literal

Other

Open Instruction

10

83

7

Sarcastic Instruction

98

1

1
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As can be seen, the contexts that were produced differed under the two types
of instructions provided. One instruction group asked the participants to create
“meaningful” contexts, while the other group asked for contexts that created sarcastic
utterances. It is also of interest that 10% of the items created in the open instruction
group turned out to be sarcastic, despite not being specifically asked to produce a
sarcastic context. Recall as well that the items were in the mid-range of the
conventionality of sarcasm and ease of constructing a sarcastic context ratings, when
measured out-of-context. Despite not being rated as a conventionally sarcastic
statement (in isolation), some participants still chose to generate a context to support
a sarcastic meaning despite not being prompted to do so. We will discuss an
implication of this finding in the Discussion section.
Given that the instructional manipulation was effective in discriminating
sarcastic from non-sarcastic use of an utterance, the items were examined further to
determine correlates of this difference. The next set of analyses examined
characteristics that the participants put into the discourse context to invite a sarcastic
(from a non-sarcastic) reading of a given item. Both subjective and objective indices
were taken. The following section will review the objective measure and the
associated results.
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Do sarcastic and non-sarcastic contexts differ at the lexical level?
The objective measure used for this analysis is a software program called the
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (Pennebaker, Francis & Booth, 2001). The
LIWC software analysis provides an objective measure of linguistic characteristics
for comparison between the contexts generated by the two instruction groups
(sarcastic vs. open).
The LIWC analyzes samples of text on a word-by-word basis and compares each
word to a dictionary divided into 74 categories. Some of these categories are linguistic in
nature, such as identifying the frequency with which articles such as “a” or “the” are
employed. Other categories are based on normative ratings by a set of judges; examples
of this type of category would be “negative emotion words” or refer to specific mental
states such as being “tentative” (indexed by words such as “perhaps”) or refer to social
processes, such as those indicating friendship relationships (indexed by words such as
“buddy” or “pal”). Although an admittedly crude instrument, the LIWC nonetheless has
proven it can identify cases where people are lying (e.g. Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, &
Richards, 2003) or of gendered language differences in usage by men and women
(Newman, Groom, Handelman, & Pennebaker, 2008) among other findings.
The authors of the LIWC have argued that the word count “… fails to appreciate
sarcasm or irony” (Newman et al., 2008, p.217). Although admittedly crude and
recognizing that subtle uses of non-literal language especially might be miscategorized
by the LIWC algorithm, we believe that the efficacy of the LIWC should not be
discounted as a means of identifying contextual differences, especially in a situation such
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as we find here, where the contexts have been generated to explicitly display sarcasm.
Thus, the aim here is to see whether some of the effects found between generated
contexts that invite sarcasm and those that do not can be attributed to the specific stylistic
choices employed in creating the relevant contexts.
To meet these aims, the generated contexts – at approximately two thousand - that
were collected above were input into the L.I.W.C. 2007 program and analyzed to
determine whether the contexts that produced sarcasm differed in the type of language
employed from contexts that did not produce sarcasm. The items that successfully
conveyed sarcasm were taken from the sarcastic instruction group and contrasted with the
items from the open instruction group that were seen as literal in meaning. The output of
the program is the percentage of words found in each of the 74 categories per total
number of words in the text file.
Despite the claim that the LIWC was incapable of identifying sarcasm, reliable
differences between the two groups were found in 31 of the categories. Because of the
fact we were examining minimal contexts and thus might make salient spurious
differences, we report here statistical differences only for those categories in which at
least 3% of the total words fell into one of the two groups. The categories that met this
criterion are displayed in tables 2 and 3. As can be seen, the contexts that invited a
sarcastic reading differed from those that did not. They differed in terms of linguistic
variables and based on judged characteristics.
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Table 2
Means (in percentage) of the Significant Factors Between Sarcastic and Open
Instruction Groups, for the Linguistic Processes Scale

Linguistic Processes Scale

Group

Factor

Sarcastic

Examples

Open

F

Negations

No, not, never

4.17

1.33

39.83**

Present Tense

Is, does, hear

6.92

4.70

7.54*

Personal Pronouns

I, them, her

5.47

7.23

6.24*

Auxiliary Verbs

Am, will, have

11.72

9.83

5.88*

3rd Person Sing.

She, her, him

3.02

4.79

5.74*

Past Tense

Went, ran, had

8.76

10.49

5.42*

Articles

A, an, the

9.07

8.03

5.02*

Pronouns

I, them, itself

8.30

10.34

4.83*

9.26

10.93

4.76*

Prepositions

To, with

* indicates significant at .05 level; ** indicates significant at the .01 level
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Table 3
Means (in percentage) of the Significant Factors Between Sarcastic and Open
Instruction Groups, for the L.I.W.C Psychological Processes Scale and the Personal
Concerns Scale.
Psychological Processes Scale
Factors

Group

Examples

Sarcastic

Open

F

Negative
Emotions

Hurt, ugly,
nasty

4.88

1.22

91.07**

Positive
Emotions

Love, nice,
sweet

3.56

6.44

32.70**

Exclusive

But, without,
exclude

3.35

1.39

23.49**

Social

Mate, talk, they,
child

9.84

12.07

12.59*

Perceptual
Processes

Observing,
heard, feeling

2.48

3.34

8.06*

Relativity

Area, bend, exit,
stop

12.54

14.63

5.97*

* indicates significant at .05 level; ** indicates significant at the .01 level
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Although not directly tied to the putative necessary characteristics proposed by
different theorists, several aspects of these data are intriguing. First, the sarcastic inviting
contexts contain more negations, more negative emotions and fewer positive emotions
than the non-sarcastic contexts. On face, this is consistent with the notion that negative
tension is important in creating an ironic environment. Second, the sarcastic contexts
contained more instances of present tense, and fewer of past tense, then the non-sarcastic
contexts. These data might suggest that relative to non-sarcastic contexts, the sarcastic
contexts are more immediate or more frequently involve the activation of event structures
that are being simulated as ongoing (see for instance, Ferretti & Katz, 2009, for
examinations of event structures, verb aspect and autobiographical memories). Finally,
one can speculate that the higher frequency of exclusion terms in the sarcastic contexts
are an index of failed expectations. Naturally, one can only speculate on the reasons for
the differences we observe here and studies designed to test alternative explanations are
required. Regardless, the presence of so many differences in what are, after all, minimal
contexts points to the presence of stylistic differences in the discourse associated with
creating a sense of sarcasm.
Overall, the key finding related to this investigation is that the participants who
generated the sarcastic contexts used different words to support the target utterance
and that on face, some of these lexical differences were consistent with theoretical
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explanations as to how sarcastic and non-sarcastic contexts differ from one another.
In the next section we address these theoretical contextual differences directly, by
examination of participant ratings.

Subjective Ratings
The same two coders as used before were employed again. This time the task of
the coders was to classify the generated contexts for; allusion to failed expectations,
pragmatic insincerity, negative tension and presence of a victim. The coders were
given the definitions of each concept, as used in the extant literature, and asked to
indicate for each concept whether or not in their opinion an item possessed the
concept being considered. There was agreement on classification by the two coders
on 99% of the items.
As predicted by these theories, the contexts generated under the sarcastic
instructions were more likely to exhibit an allusion to failed expectations (M = 24.28;
S.D. = 1.01 vs. M = 1.64; S.D. = 2.03 in the open instruction group; t(82) = 63.286; p <
0.01.), pragmatic insincerity (M = 22.6; S.D. = 1.34 vs. M = 0.88; S.D. = 1.47; t(82) =
71.302); the presence of negative tension (M = 23.4; S.D. = 0.85 vs. M = 2.49; S.D. =
3.89; t(82) = 34.932; p < 0.01) and the presence of a victim (M = 20.47; S.D. = 0.85 vs.
(M = 1.79; S.D. = 1.44); t(82) = 72.987, p < 0.01. The means here refer to the number of
items on average per 25 items that contain that contextual component generated by each
participant. For example, of the 25 generated items in the sarcastic instruction group per
participant, 24.28 on average were rated as containing an allusion to failed expectations
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whereas only an average of 1.64 of the generated items out of 25 for the open instruction
group contained an allusion to failed expectations.

Discussion
The findings from the above experiment show that the target sentences, when
presented in isolation, were not seen as being conventionally sarcastic in nature.
These same target sentences however, when surrounded by contextual information
provided by the participants asked to create a sarcastic context, were later coded as
being sarcastic by a naïve rater. Our aim was to have items that were not too
conventional one way or the other (sarcastic or literal) with the hope that
accompanying contextual information could push the meaning to be either sarcastic
or literal. The findings indicate that our goal was achieved.
The findings from the context generation task showed that the contexts
created by the two instruction groups differed significantly in both objective and
subjective measures. The objective measure showed that the participants used
different types of words in the creation of the contexts dependent on whether the goal
was to achieve sarcasm or just to make a meaningful statement. The findings from
the subjective coding showed that the components proposed by the models of sarcasm
covered earlier are often found in the contexts created. In other words, the subjective
coding found that the proposed necessary components are often present in the
contextual information that was generated by the participants. The logical next step
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then is to see if these components that are often present in sarcastic contexts are
actually necessary for the successful interpretation of a sarcastic utterance, and data to
this end will be presented in the upcoming chapter.
The differences found thus far have demonstrated that sarcastic contexts and
literal contexts differ in the components used to sway the meaning towards either the
sarcastic or the literal. The findings also demonstrate that participants are able to
successfully create contextual information that conveys sarcastic meaning. This is an
important finding because it allows us to employ the more empirical context
generation task rather than providing participants with pre-written contextual items.
The following chapter will investigate whether the components proposed by the
different models are indeed necessary to successfully convey sarcastic meaning.
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CHAPTER THREE: IDENTIFYING WHETHER THERE ARE NECESSARY
CONDITIONS FOR SARCASM
In the earlier sections we have demonstrated that items that out-of-context are
not rated as sarcastic can be seen as such when placed in a context generated by
participants to make the items understood as being intentionally sarcastic (relative to
a comparison group). We have also demonstrated that the generated contexts differ at
the lexical level, at least by coders using a binary classification system in terms of
perceived levels of violated expectation, negative tension, pragmatic insincerity and
presence of a victim. In this chapter we will again analyze the generated contexts, but
now subject the contexts to ratings by a large sample of naïve raters along the Likertscale dimensions. The data so provided permits for an examination of the interrelations amongst the putative necessary conditions proposed in different theories,
and whether which, if any, of the theoretical components are in fact necessary in
producing a sense of sarcasm. This section will pose two questions. First, do the
factors suggested by different theories independently predict level of sarcasm?
Second, which, if any, of the suggested factors are necessary for producing a sense of
sarcasm? Once again, the five scales employed earlier are used: level of sarcasm;
presence of a victim; allusion to failed expectation; negative tension and pragmatic
sincerity.
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Do the factors suggested by different theories independently predict level of
sarcasm?
Participants
Eighty-two participants were tested (46 females: with a mean age of 19 years
old). The participants were undergraduate students at the University of Western
Ontario who participated as a requirement for Introductory Psychology and who
received one research credit for their participation.
Materials
The contexts generated in the context completion task were presented to the
participants in booklet form. Each of the generated contexts and target sentences
were supplemented by the five rating scales used by the coders: level of sarcasm;
presence of a victim; negative tension; allusion to failed expectations and pragmatic
sincerity.
Each participant rated one of the booklets created during the context completion
task described in Chapter Two. Along with the booklets of items, the participants in
this study were given 25 pages of blank ratings to fill out. The ratings were eight
point scales ranging from 0-7. The five ratings used were based upon the
characteristics coded for earlier: level of sarcasm; presence of a victim; negative
tension; allusion to failed expectations and pragmatic insincerity. Each participant
received a booklet containing 25 items. The task took approximately 45 minutes to
complete.
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Participants were given the same definitions for each of the scale terms as those
given to the coders. Examples of the scales are depicted below:
Level of Sarcasm
Not at all
0

Extremely
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Presence of a Victim
Not at all
0

Clearly
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Negative Tension
Not at all
0

Extremely
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Allusion to Failed Expectations
Not at all
0

Clearly
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Pragmatic Insincerity
Not at all
0

Clearly
1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Results and Discussion
The mean ratings for the sarcastic and open instruction groups and summary
ANOVA statistics for each scale are shown in Table 4.
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Table 4
ANOVA results showing Rating level means, F values and significance levels

Sarcasm Instruction

Open Instruction

M

SD

M

SD

Level of Sarcasm

6.05

.83

1.82

.63

204.21

.01

Presence of Victim

4.26

.74

1.37

.41

121.11

.01

Negative Tension

4.53

1.18

1.53

.24

99.18

.01

Failed Expectation

4.65

.92

1.43

.18

101.89

.01

Pragmatic Insincerity

5.33

1.32

2.04

.79

111.07

.01

Factor

F

Sig.
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The data acquired in this section is comparable to the findings in the earlier
coding section (see chapter two), however these findings are from a much larger
sample (82 participants vs. 2 independent raters) and come from a more fine-grained
measure (8-point scales vs. dichotomous categorization). That is, we found that the
proposed conditions are generally present in the sarcastic items and that the contexts
created in the sarcastic instruction group differed from those created in the open
instruction group. The data collected here allows for an examination of the interrelations amongst the scales. Table 5 depicts the relation between variability in rating
of level of sarcasm with the four other measures employed here. As can be seen,
variations in degree of sarcasm is correlated moderately with each of the measured
dimensions, ranging from r = .637 (pragmatic insincerity) to r = .784 (negative
tension). The conditions also correlate with each other (shown in Table 5), ranging
from a moderate correlation (r = .452 for Presence of a Victim and Pragmatic
Insincerity) to a strong correlation (r = .759 for Negative Tension and Failed
Expectation).
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Table 5
Pearson Correlation Matrix for Sarcasm Ratings and Identified Components

Victim

Victim

Pragmatic
Insincerity

Negative
Tension

Failed
Expectation

Sarcasm Level

1.000

.452*

.637*

.590*

.727*

1.000

.520*

.499*

.637*

1.000

.759*

.784*

1.000

.769*

Pragmatic
Insincerity
Negative
Tension
Failed
Expectation

*p < 0.01 (2-tailed)
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A stepwise regression analysis was conducted in which the four key
components (Negative Tension; Failed Expectation; Pragmatic Insincerity; and
Presence of a Victim) were used to predict the level of Sarcasm. The step-wise
regression analysis was significant; F(4, 1941) = 1753.7 p < .001; R = .88, R ² = .78.
Table 6 shows the standardized coefficients partial correlations and significance tests.
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Table 6
Summary of stepwise regression analysis on Sarcasm using the other key components as
predictors.
Independent Variable

R

R-square

β

t value

Negative Tension

.784a

.614

.267

15.13

Significant Change in
Sarcasm Level; p <
.01

Victim

.837b

.701

.287

20,23

.01

Pragmatic Insincerity

.865c

.749

.226

17.77

.01

Failed Expectations

.884d

.781

.284

16.94

.01

a. Predictors: (Constant), Negative Tension
b. Predictors: (Constant), Negative Tension, Victim
c. Predictors: (Constant), Negative Tension, Victim, Pragmatic Insincerity
d. Predictors: (Constant), Negative Tension, Victim, Pragmatic Insincerity,
Failed Expectations
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Based on the results of the regression, it is apparent that each of the four
targeted conditions (allusion to failed expectations, pragmatic insincerity, negative
tension and presence of a victim) independently predicts level of sarcasm. This
finding supports the claim that each of the factors assumed by one or another of the
theories regarding conditions necessary for sarcasm contributes independent
predictability to ratings of sarcasm. As such, the regression analysis supports the
claims put forth by both the allusional pretense model and the implicit display model
that the sense of sarcastic verbal irony is directly predicted by the presence allusion to
failed expectations; negative tension; and pragmatic insincerity. It also supports the
argument that a factor in addition to those described in those theories is the presence
of a victim. These findings confirm that the presence or allusion to each of these
factors is sufficient contributors to a sense of sarcasm. These data do not indicate,
however, whether each of these conditions is necessary to produce a sense of
sarcasm. The question of necessity is addressed in the next section.

What Factors are Necessary for Producing a Sense of Sarcasm?
In the following section, the ratings collected using the 8-point sarcasm scales
will be analyzed in order to directly evaluate the predictions inferred by the major
theories related to sarcastic verbal irony covered previously (Implicit Display Model;
Allusional Pretense Model; and Presence of a Victim). Each of the characteristics
will be examined in turn to see whether or not they are deemed as necessary to
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creating a sense of sarcasm. The logic of these analyses is that sarcasm should be
most apparent (or only apparent) when each of the necessary conditions posited by an
extant theory is met. Because failed expectation is a component of each theoretical
position, it will always be a factor in the analyses below. Orthogonal to the failed
expectation factor will be a unique contribution of the other proposed factors, namely
negative tension, pragmatic insincerity and presence of a victim respectively. As an
example, to support the implicit display model both an allusion to failed expectations
and negative tension would be required to produce an ironic environment that leads to
a sense of sarcastic irony (Utsumi, 2000). For other theories, different components
would be involved.
The following section will review analysis done to test each of the theories
separately, looking at the key conditions related to each model and measuring them
against level of sarcasm. The data for each comparison will be presented as follows: we
will take each item generated in the context generation task and categorize them
according to how they were rated in the rating task. All items that were rated as 5 or
higher on the scales used in the rating task will be placed into a “high” category and all
items that were rated as 3 or lower on each scale will be put into a “low” category. For
example, an item that was rated as 6 on the negative tension scale will be placed within
the High negative tension group. An item that was rated as 2 on the pragmatic insincerity
scale will be placed in the Low insincerity group. By separating the items into these high
and low categories it will allow us to directly test if having low or high levels of the key
components changes the level of sarcasm associated with each item.
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Due to the fact that each theory covered in this paper has the condition of allusion
to failed expectation as part of the associated model, we have included that condition in
each analysis. Along with allusion to failed expectation, the additional key condition will
be categorized into high and low for each model. For example, negative tension will be
included along with allusion to failed expectation for measuring the implicit display
model. Also included in the analysis will be the type of instruction variable (open vs.
sarcastic). This will create for each analysis a 2 (high/low failed expectation) X 2
(high/low on a unique characteristic, such as negative tension) X 2 (items generated
under sarcasm or open conditions) structure. The sarcasm ratings given each item will be
employed as the dependent variables in an ANOVA.
The logic here is simple and analogous for those employed in studies examining
whether there are necessary features of concepts (e.g., Hampton, 1995): If conditions
deemed necessary are in fact necessary, then those items rated at the top of the 7-point
sarcasm scale would fall into the high-high group. It would not be expected, for example,
to have items rated as high as possible on the rating of sarcasm to fall into any low group,
and especially not into a low-low group (e.g., low failed expectation-low negative tension
group). The next sections will separately test each of the three theories covered in this
paper; the implicit display model; allusional pretense model; and presence of a victim.
Direct Analysis of Ratings for Implicit Display Model
In this section a more direct comparison will be made between the ratings
collected and predictions put forth by the model of implicit display. Recall that the
two specific necessary conditions put forth by the implicit display model were an
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allusion to failed expectations and negative tension (Utsumi, 2000). In order to
measure the predictions of this theory, all of the sarcastic instruction items were
separated into categories related to the ratings received on the conditions of allusion
to failed expectation and negative tension.
A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the impact of negative tension
and allusion to failed expectations on the level of sarcasm found in the generated
items from the two instruction groups (Sarcasm vs. Open). The conditions of negative
tension and allusion to failed expectations were divided into two levels (high and
low). Recall that the high level category is defined by ratings of 5, 6, or 7 and the low
level category is defined by all items rated 3, 2, or 1, thereby creating the four groups
being tested (High Negative Tension/High Failed Expectation; High Negative
Tension/Low Failed Expectation; Low Negative Tension/High Failed Expectation;
Low Negative Tension/Low Failed Expectation). The number of items that were
allocated into each of the four categories and broken down into their corresponding
level of sarcasm is presented in Table 7. The level of sarcasm means, standard
deviations and number of items of each group taken from the sarcastic instruction
items and the open instruction items can be found in Table 8.
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Table 7
Frequency counts for Implicit Display category (Allusion to Failed Expectation and
Negative Tension)
1 = always refers to failed expectation
2 = negative tension
SARCASM LEVEL
Implicit display

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

H1– H2

281

139

40

10

4

2

1

H1 – L2

52

26

5

6

1

1

Ø

L1 – H2

53

31

15

8

2

9

Ø

L1 – L2

40

21

11

12

5

12

9
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Table 8
Mean Sarcasm Rating, Standard Deviations and Number of item in each Group for
the Implicit Display Model;
Sarcastic Instruction items
Group
M
SD
N
_________________________________________________________
High Negative Tension
High Failed Expectations

6.5

.81

474

High Negative Tension
Low Failed Expectations

6.3

1.1

81

Low Negative Tension
High Failed Expectations

6.1

1.3

103

Low Negative Tension
4.4
2.7
131
Low Failed Expectations
__________________________________________________________

Open Instruction items
Group
M
SD
N
__________________________________________________________
High Negative Tension
High Failed Expectations

5.96

1.70

90

High Negative Tension
Low Failed Expectations

5.48

1.12

21

Low Negative Tension
High Failed Expectations

4.31

2.22

29

Low Negative Tension
0.9
1.6
786
Low Failed Expectations
___________________________________________________________
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The ANOVA showed a significant main effect for instruction type on sarcasm
level F(1, 1729) = 106.54 ; p < .01. The main effect for allusion to failed expectation
on sarcasm level was significant F(1, 1729) = 227.89; p < .01. There was also a main
effect of negative tension on level of sarcasm F(1, 1729) = 214.31; p < .01. The
interaction between allusion to failed expectations and negative tension was
significant F(1, 1729) = 72.96; p < .01. The interaction between allusion to failed
expectation, negative tension and instruction was significant F(1, 1729) = 14.16; p <
.01.
Discussion
The finding that items which were rated as low in both of the necessary
conditions proposed by the Implicit Display Model also showed a significantly
lowered level of sarcasm ratings would be considered supportive of the predictions
put forth by the Implicit Display Model. However, the findings from the groups that
were rated as high in just one of the two conditions (while scoring low in the other)
yet still showed high levels of sarcasm could bring into question whether or not both
conditions are necessary for comprehension of a sarcastic utterance. More
specifically, if these two conditions are both necessary for sarcastic comprehension,
then a low rating in either condition should result in a significant drop in the
conveyance of sarcastic meaning, regardless of whether or not the other condition is
rated as high. The high frequency of items that have high ratings in both of the
conditions proposed by the implicit display model supports the likelihood that these
conditions will be present in a context supporting a sarcastic utterance, however the
continued existence of a high level of sarcastic meaning when the level of one of
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these conditions is low leads to a questioning of the necessity of the conditions
proposed by the implicit display model in conveying sarcastic meaning.

Direct Measure of the Allusional Pretense Model
The next section will analyze the data in terms of how they relate to the
predictions of the allusional pretense model. Recall that the allusional pretense model
claims that the necessary components of a sarcastic utterance are an allusion to failed
expectations and pragmatic insincerity. Once again the items were categorized into
high and low groups. The resulting groups for this analysis were High Failed
Expectations-High Insincerity; High Failed Expectations-Low Insincerity; Low
Failed Expectations-High Insincerity; and Low Failed Expectations-Low Insincerity.
Shown in Table 9 are the counts for items that were rated high and low for the two
key components of the allusional pretense model and broken down by their associated
level of sarcasm rating.
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Table 9
Frequency counts for Allusional Pretense category (Allusion to Failed Expectation and
Pragmatic Insincerity) 1 = refers to allusion to failed expectation
3 = pragmatic insincerity

Category

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

H1 – H3

286

133

46

8

4

2

Ø

H1 – L3

22

23

23

15

4

2

2

L1 – H3

87

35

15

8

1

5

6

L1 – L3

4

4

3

12

6

4

Ø
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A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was run to measure the impact of failed expectation;
pragmatic insincerity and instruction on the level of sarcasm, in accordance with the
predictions put forth by the allusional pretense model. Similar to the previous
analysis the conditions have two levels (high and low), the difference being that in
this analysis the conditions being tested are allusion to failed expectations and
insincerity. Once again the factor of instructional group (Sarcasm vs. Open) is being
measured. The ratings were divided into high and low using the same method as the
previous analysis. The dependent variable is once again level of sarcasm. The
means; standard deviations on level of sarcasm and the number of items for each
group for the sarcasm instruction items and the open instruction items are displayed
in Table 10.
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Table 10
Level of Sarcasm Means, Standard Deviations and Number of item in each Group for the
Allusion Pretense Model;

Sarcastic Instruction items
Group
M
SD
N
__________________________________________________________
High Failed Expectations
High Pragmatic Insincerity

6.46

.87

503

High Failed Expectations
Low Pragmatic Insincerity

5.83

1.45

72

Low Failed Expectations
High Pragmatic Insincerity

6.09

1.63

140

Low Failed Expectations
3.13
2.54
63
Low Pragmatic Insincerity
__________________________________________________________
Open Instruction items
Group
M
SD
N
__________________________________________________________
High Failed Expectations
High Pragmatic Insincerity

5.85

1.82

47

High Failed Expectations
Low Pragmatic Insincerity

5.33

2.25

61

Low Failed Expectations
High Pragmatic Insincerity

1.24

2.02

281

Low Failed Expectations
0.8
1.63
366
Low Pragmatic Insincerity
___________________________________________________________

53

There was a significant main effect for instruction type on sarcasm level
F(1, 1525) = 321.04 ; p < .01. The main effect for allusion to failed expectation on
sarcasm level was significant F(1, 1525) = 696.1; p < .01. There was also a main
effect of insincerity on level of sarcasm F(1, 1525) = 96.69; p < .01. The interaction
between allusion to failed expectations and insincerity was significant F(1, 1525) =
72.96; p < .01. The interaction between failed expectation, insincerity and instruction
was also significant, F(1, 1525) = 27.56; p < .01.
Discussion
Similar to the findings for the implicit display model, the finding that items
which scored low in both of the necessary conditions proposed by the allusional
pretense model also showed significantly lowered level of sarcasm ratings would be
considered supportive of the predictions put forth by the allusional pretense model.
However, once again the findings from the groups that were high in just one of the
two conditions (while scoring low in the other) still showed high levels of sarcasm,
bringing into question whether or not both conditions are necessary for
comprehension of a sarcastic utterance. More specifically, if these two conditions are
both necessary for sarcastic comprehension, then a low rating in either the allusion to
failed expectation or pragmatic insincerity condition should result in a significant
drop in the level of sarcastic meaning. Again, the high frequency of items that have
high ratings in both of the conditions proposed by the allusional pretense model
supports the likelihood that these conditions will be present in a context supporting a
sarcastic utterance. However the continued existence of a high level of sarcastic
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meaning when the level of one of these conditions is low leads to a questioning of the
necessity of the conditions in producing sarcastic meaning, much like the findings for
the implicit display model.

Direct Measure of Presence of a Victim
The final set of analysis for the direct measure of the theories deals with the
presence of a victim. Recall that researchers (Lee & Katz, 1998) have identified that
having a specific victim of ridicule is a distinguishing feature for sarcastic utterances.
According to Lee & Katz (1998) it is this directed ridicule and the identified victim
that differentiates sarcasm from verbal irony. Therefore this set of analysis focused
on the presence of victim ratings along with the allusion to failed expectations.
Shown in Table 11 are the counts for items that were rated high and low for the two
key components and broken down by their associated level of sarcasm rating.
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Table 11
Frequency counts for each category for each theory
1 = always refers to failed expectation
4 = presence of victim
Category

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

H1 – H4

247

128

32

8

1

Ø

Ø

H1 – L4

87

56

16

6

5

1

3

L1 – H4

75

29

8

2

2

2

Ø

L1 – L4

28

12

8

15

4

7

30
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A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was run to measure the impact of failed expectation;
presence of a victim and instruction on the level of sarcasm. Similar to the previous
analyses the conditions have two levels (high and low), the difference being that in
this analysis the conditions being tested are allusion to failed expectations and
presence of a victim. Once again the factor of instructional group (Sarcasm vs. Open)
is being measured. The ratings were divided into high and low using the same
method as the previous analysis. The resulting four groups for this analysis then are:
High Failed Expectation/High Victim; High Failed Expectation/Low Victim; Low
Failed Expectation/High Victim; and Low Failed Expectation/Low Victim. The
dependent variable is once again level of sarcasm. The means; standard deviations on
level of sarcasm and the number of items for each group for the sarcasm instruction
items and the open instruction items are displayed in Table 12.
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Table 12
Level of Sarcasm Means, Standard Deviations and Number of item for each Group;

Sarcastic Instruction items
Group
M
SD
N
__________________________________________________________
High Failed Expectations
High Presence of a Victim

6.47

.87

416

High Failed Expectations
Low Presence of a Victim

6.14

1.45

174

Low Failed Expectations
High Presence of a Victim

6.42

1.63

118

Low Failed Expectations
3.87
2.54
104
Low Presence of a Victim
__________________________________________________________

Open Instruction items
Group
M
SD
N
__________________________________________________________
High Failed Expectations
High Presence of a Victim

5.84

1.82

69

High Failed Expectations
Low Presence of a Victim

3.95

2.25

41

Low Failed Expectations
High Presence of a Victim

4.96

2.02

25

Low Failed Expectations
0.59
1.63
761
Low Presence of a Victim
_______________________________________________________________
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Discussion
Once again, the finding that items which scored low in both of the targeted
conditions (allusion to failed expectation and presence of a victim) also showed
significantly lowered level of sarcasm ratings and would be considered supportive of
the predictions put forth by researchers claiming that allusion to failed expectations
and presence of a victim are necessary components of sarcastic utterances. However,
once again the findings from the groups that were high in just one of the two
conditions (while scoring low in the other) showed high levels of sarcasm and this
finding could bring into question whether or not both conditions are necessary for
comprehension of a sarcastic utterance. Consistent with the previous two analyses,
the high frequency of items that were given high ratings in both of the conditions
proposed supports the likelihood that these conditions will be present in a context
supporting a sarcastic utterance, however the continued existence of a high level of
sarcastic meaning when the level of one of these conditions is low leads to a
questioning of the necessity of the conditions in conveying sarcastic meaning.
Recall however, that researchers (e.g. Lee & Katz, 1998) have claimed that
presence of a victim distinguishes sarcasm from verbal irony. Therefore it may be
possible that the participants doing the rating task did not distinguish between
sarcasm and verbal irony. As a result, items that were low in presence of a victim but
high in allusion to failed expectations could be ironic items that were just treated as
sarcastic and as a result rated highly on the sarcasm scale.
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Another interesting finding comes from an overall comparison of the sarcastic
instruction group ratings compared to the open group for all the key categories. The
open instruction group obviously had much fewer items that were considered to be
sarcastic, however even when not prompted to come up with a sarcastic context, the
rating means for three of the categories showed a very similar pattern as the sarcastic
instruction group. In other words, even without being prompted to develop a
sarcastic context, individuals seemed to include some combination of the proposed
conditions. The analysis once again found that when any one of those conditions
(allusion to failed expectation or presence of a victim) is rated at a high level it will
result in a highly rated sarcastic interpretation. When the conditions were all scored
as low in the open group, the utterances were rated very low on level of sarcasm. This
is likely due to the fact that the participants for those items were developing a literal
context.
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CHAPTER FOUR: GENERAL DISCUSSION OF FIRST SET OF
STUDIES
The findings from the analyses described in chapters 2 and 3 are clear in that the
contextual characteristics generated under sarcastic instruction items significantly
differ from the characteristics generated under of the open instruction group.
Coding and subjective measures:
The coding results from the context completion task have demonstrated that
participants consistently included the components proposed in the implicit display
model. Recall that according to the implicit display model, two of the key
components were negative tension (on the part of the speaker) and allusion to failed
expectations. The coding results could also be seen as supportive of the allusional
pretense model due to the high number of items containing an allusional to failed
expectations and pragmatic insincerity. In addition, the coding results also showed
support for the proposal that an allusion to failed expectations and the presence of a
victim are consistently found in sarcastic context.
Results however from the larger subjective measure phase provide both
supportive and potentially contrarian evidence to the proposal that these components
are all necessary for the successful comprehension of a sarcastic utterance. The
support can be found in the results showing that level of sarcasm was correlated
reliably with each of the components proposed by the theories and coded for in the
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experiment (presence of a victim, negative tension, allusion to failed expectation and
pragmatic insincerity).
The result that can raise questions about the necessity of these components was
the finding that items were sometimes rated both highly sarcastic and at the same time
rated low (3 or less on the scale) on one of the other presumably necessary
components such as negative tension or allusion to failed expectations. Moreover,
although the correlations of the targeted conditions with level of sarcasm were
reliable, they were only moderately high, sharing variability with rated sarcasm of
about 25% at the best. Thus, it may be that the characteristics proposed as inviting
sarcasm might be sufficient, but that any one by itself might not be necessary to
producing a state of sarcasm. Perhaps a high level of any one of these components is
what creates a successful comprehension of a sarcastic utterance. Alternatively, it
may be that no one characteristic is necessary but instead what is needed is several of
these components to be present before sarcastic intent is communicated. In line with
this last proposal, items were occasionally rated as pragmatically sincere but at the
same time extremely sarcastic, going against the proposal put forth that allusional
pretense alone can create a state of sarcasm (Kumon-Nakamura et al., 2007). An
example of such an item is provided below.
Example of Generated Items found to be high in Sarcasm and Pragmatic
Sincerity:
“Michael and Sandra are driving through the city.
The car in front of Michael cuts him off without warning.
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Michael says to Sandra,
‘I love it when people use their signals.’

Items such as these did not appear often, however they were generally scored
extremely low on the insincerity scale but extremely high on the sarcasm scale. This
is another example of the conditions proposed by the theories as being generally
present but perhaps not necessary for sarcastic/ironic understanding.
The findings from study 1 and 2 have demonstrated through objective and
subjective measures that differences exist between the contexts that were generated to
make an utterance sarcastic or not. It is apparent that people will incorporate different
conditions and characteristics into the contextual information for sarcastic utterances
compared to literal. The results from the studies described in Chapters 1 and 2 do not
support the necessity of conditions proposed in the implicit display model and the
allusional pretense theory of verbal irony comprehension. The findings do support the
importance of the proposed conditions but because one can find many instances in
which the conditions are not met and still find perceived sarcasm it appears that these
conditions are not necessary for conveying sarcastic/ironic meaning. Finally, the
findings from the studies presented above have provided us with a corpus of
empirically generated test items that can be utilized for the investigation of the temporal
processing of sarcastic/ironic utterances. One such study is presented in the next
Chapter.
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Constraint Satisfaction
Given that our data indicates that the presumed conditions for creating a sense
of sarcasm are not necessary, one can ask whether an alternative model will fit the data
better. Such alternatives would be models in which there are no single set of necessary
or sufficient features but instead that comprehension of language in general, including
non-literal and sarcastic language, involves utilizing all of the information that a person
has at his/her command at any one point in time. With sarcasm this would include the
variables identified here but could of course include other variables, such as tone of
voice (e.g. Rockwell, 2000), facial expression, discourse markers, humour or, online,
use of emoticons.
One way this general approach has been instantiated has been with constraint
satisfaction models, a position taken for the other instances of non-literal language (see,
for instance Katz & Ferretti, 2001) along with data emerging in the more general
language comprehension literature (e.g., Spivey-Knowlton & Sedivy, 1995). In such
models, the focus is on the different variables (constraints) present in the context that
may increase or decrease the activation of a non-literal interpretation relative to a literal
one during the act of comprehension. The determination of meaning, in this case, a
sarcastic meaning, is a competitive process. The meaning that emerges ultimately is
that which is most activated (itself determined by the strength of the different sources
of information available). Thus, as applied to the data presented here, a sense of
sarcasm is activated to the extent that negative tension, failed expectation, presence of a
victim (etc) all point to the same conclusion and the activation lessens as some of these

64

constraints provide competing interpretation (as would happen if there was, for an
instance, a victim, but no failed expectation).
The studies covered so far have allowed us to directly test some of the claims
regarding the necessary components allowing for conveying sarcastic meaning. Here
we consider the temporal processing involved in the comprehension of sarcasm. There
are several theories related to the temporal processing of figurative language, with these
theories differing on whether we are obligated to activate certain information or not (an
overview of these theories will be presented in the next Chapter).
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CHAPTER FIVE: TEMPORAL PROCESSING OF SARCASM
Over the last two decades, theoretical questions about the processing of
nonliteral language have often employed reading time measures as a sensitive means
of determining when the non-literal sense is accessed. The initial question addressed
within this framework was whether the non-literal (e.g., sarcastic) meaning is
accessed directly (given a supportive discourse context) or whether one is obligated to
process the literal meaning of the statement before embarking on alternative nonliteral possibilities.

Some researchers have proposed that the literal version of the

statement must be processed before the non-literal version (e.g., Dews & Winner,
1999). According to this viewpoint, individuals must first engage in an obligatory
processing of the literal meaning prior to successfully processing the correct
figurative interpretation. This has become known as the traditional view, or standard
pragmatic view, of language processing and is covered more in depth in a later
section.
Other researchers (see Gibbs, 1984; Giora, 2003) have proposed that factors
such as contextual information or salience will determine which meaning is processed
initially. These direct access models claim contextual information directly invites a
literal or nonliteral interpretation and one is not obligated to process either form
initially. When exemplified by Gibbs (1984), the claim is that context can inform the
interpreter to the extent that the figurative meaning (sarcastic in this case) can be
accessed directly without first processing the literal meaning. The graded salience
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model (Giora, 2003), on the other hand, claims that we are obligated to process the
salient sense of an utterance, despite the accompanying context (though context itself
has an effect). In some instances the salient sense is the non-literal meaning, as with
highly familiar metaphor or presumably, expressions typically used sarcastically.
The purpose of the study presented in this chapter is to demonstrate the utility of
the irony production data produced and analyzed in the earlier chapters. Specifically,
the effects of negative tension will be examined. The next section will describe in
more detail some of the theories dealing with temporal processing of non-literal
language, and also discuss the potential role of negativity in the temporal processing
of sarcastic statements.
Overview of Theories Dealing with Temporal Processing of Figurative Language
Standard Pragmatic Model of Language Processing
The traditional view of figurative language processing that has been prominent
over the years is now often referred to as the standard pragmatic model. According to
this approach, an addressee is first obligated to process the literal sense of a statement,
regardless of the accompanying contextual information, and only then seek a secondary
(in this case sarcastic) sense if the literal meaning is incompatible with the surrounding
context (see Katz, 2000 for a review). The model suggests that a sarcastic utterance such
as, “This room is totally clean”, is processed in three steps. First, a person must (a)
compute the utterance’s context-independent literal meaning; then the person must (b)
decide whether the literal interpretation is the speaker’s intended meaning; and then (c) if
the literal interpretation is inappropriate given the context in which it is embedded,
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compute the figurative (in this case sarcastic) meaning by assuming the opposite of the
literal meaning (Gibbs, 1986).
Dews and Winner (1999) presented participants with examples of ironic praise
and criticism on a computer and asked the participants to press a key as soon as they
could identify whether the speaker was intending to convey something positive or
negative. As well as the ironic/sarcastic examples, they presented their literal
counterparts. Consequently, each sentence appeared as both ironic praise and literal
criticism, or as ironic criticism and literal praise. Naturally, no participant heard the
same sentence embedded within both an ironic and literal context. The logic behind
this design was that if the participants process the literal meaning, then the literal
meaning should interfere with judging the evaluative tone of the ironic meaning,
thereby slowing down responses to the ironic statements (Dews & Winner, 1999).
They found results consistent with that prediction: participants took significantly
longer to judge sarcastic criticism as negative than to judge the same statement used
literally as a positive statement and were slower to judge sarcastic praise as positive
than to judge the same statement used literally in a negative sense. Findings such as
these (see also Schwoebel, Dews, Winner & Srinivas, 2000) support the traditional or
standard pragmatic view of language processing.
Direct Access Models
Gibbs (1994) proposed a direct access model wherein the information
present in the accompanying context can immediately direct one to an understanding
of the sarcastic target sentence, bypassing the need to first interpret the statement’s
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literal meaning. In Gibbs (1986, Experiment 1) participants read figurative and literal
comments in an elaborated discourse context, advancing at their own pace the
passages presented to them on a computer monitor, one sentence at a time. Gibbs
varied the passages by context type (positive and negative) and utterance type
(sarcastic and literal), finding that the statements in the positive context were read
more quickly than the negative statements. However, the reading times for sarcastic
and literal sentences did not differ. Gibbs took the equivalency in reading time as a
disconfirmation that an obligatory access of the literal sense was not necessary.
Naturally, these findings leaves open the possibility that, as a result of contextual
information, the sarcastic interpretation can be activated in parallel with literal
interpretation or that the context selects for a sarcastic expectation. Regardless, these
findings and others have been taken as indicating that people utilize the contextual
information available to understand the speaker’s intentions in using sarcasm very
early in processing.
A cross between the standard pragmatic approach and direct access can be
found with Rachel Giora’s graded salience model. In this model, the reader/listener of
a statement is obligated to process a statement’s salient meaning. When there is
compatibility between the contextual information and the salient meaning of the
utterance, additional processing to obtain meaning is not necessary. On the other
hand, if the contextual information is incompatible with the salient meaning of the
utterance, the salient but inappropriate meaning will be first processed then the
appropriate, less salient interpretation will be retrieved (Giora & Fein, 1999).
Because figurative language can be salient (such as with familiar metaphors or
conventional modes of expressing sarcasm), one can find instances in which
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figurative language is read as fast or even more rapidly than literal language. Thus,
unlike the standard approach, nonliteral language can be processed more rapidly than
literal language and, in this way, has similarities to direct access models.

In

summary, the graded salience model proposes that the temporal processing of
statements is not guided by the literal vs. non-literal components or fully by the
contextual characteristics leading up to the particular statement. The graded salience
model proposes that the meaning of the statement that is processed first is not
dependent on whether the statement is figurative or literal, but rather which meaning
is more familiar and as a result coded within the mental lexicon (Giora & Fein, 1999).
Constraint Satisfaction Explanations
According to Katz (2004), Pexman (2008) and others, the pattern of findings
in which figurative language is sometimes processed more slowly and sometimes
more rapidly than literal language counterparts can be most parsimoniously explained
by a constraint satisfaction approach. As explained earlier, this approach holds that
there need not be necessary conditions to induce a sense of irony (or in fact other
nonliteral forms of language, such as proverbial language). Rather a set of sufficient
conditions (or information) can either invite or discourage a specific reading. Access
of this information occurs continuously in processing with a resolution occurring
when one interpretation reaches thresholds. If the various sources of information
point towards one interpretation that resolution occurs rapidly, whereas conflicting
sources of information require acquisition of additional information before resolution
occurs (resulting in longer reading times, for instance). According to this position the
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conflicting literature can be explained by differences in the source and strength of
information presented in the discourse contexts or associated with the target sentence.
In this chapter we examine the role of one of the contextual factors that have
been posited as sufficient for inducing a sense of irony, namely negative tension.
Negativity’s Role in Temporal Processing of Irony: Based upon the implicit display
model, Utsumi (2000), Ivanko and Pexman (2003) predicted that the processing times
for irony would be faster when the contextual information and the target statement fit
the more prototypical characteristics of irony. Recall that the implicit display model
proposes that a prototypical ironic environment contains failed expectation and
negative tension on the part of the speaker as a result of those failed expectations.
According to Utsumi (2000), implicit display theory can explain the disparate
findings in the literature, in a manner compatible to that proposed by constraint
satisfaction theorists. Utsumi proposes that the equal reading times between literal
and ironic statements found in the Gibb’s study can be explained by assuming that
sarcastic sentences which are highly prototypical ironies and which are embedded
within negative contexts are identified easily as ironic. That is he claims that Gibbs
presented items within a prototype representation of an ironic environment. As such
these items are therefore processed with little to no time difference when compared to
the literally appropriate statements. In contrast, Utsumi claims the observation that
ironic utterances sometimes take longer to process than their literal counterpart occurs
when the ironic context is not very strong (i.e., is a poor representation of an ironic
environment), a condition that presumably would be found in Dews and Winner.
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There is, to our knowledge, only one test of Utsumi’s theoretical explanation.
Ivanko and Pexman (2003) created a set of stimuli in which the contexts were ‘‘strong’’
or ‘‘weak’’ or ‘‘neutral’’ indicators of the negativity associated with irony. Targets were
ironic or literal statements within that context by altering one word. To make the stimuli
appropriate for online methodology, an additional neutral sentence was added at the end
of each textoid, to study any ‘‘spill-over’’ effect. Two examples of the textoids used in
Ivanko and Pexman (2003) and presented here.
Sam agreed to pick Christopher up after school. Sam never arrived to pick up
Christopher and never called to say why / Sam arrived 1 hour late and apologized /
Sam and Christopher talked about the dance on Friday. The next day Christopher
is explaining to Jodi what happened. Christopher says:
Ironic statement: Sam is a nice friend.
Literal statement: Sam is a rotten friend.
Wrap-up sentence: Christopher and Jodi were walking home from school.
Terri agreed to help Joan with the toy drive on Saturday. Terri spent the entire
day socializing / Terri spent half the day socializing / Terri spent some of her time
helping. The next day Joan is explaining to Sara what happened. Joan says:
Ironic statement: Terri is a super helper.
Literal statement: Terri is a lazy helper.
Wrap-up sentence: The toy drive lasted from dawn until dusk.
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In both examples above the first version was considered as strongly negative, the second
as the weak negative and the last sentence as neutral. Recall the prediction arising from
implicit display theory is that the strongly negative sentence should be read more quickly
than the weakly negative sentence. In fact, Ivanko and Pexman (2003) found that the
sarcastic target utterances presented in a weakly negative context condition were read
more quickly than a sarcastic target placed within a strongly negative context, a finding
arguably inconsistent with the predictions made with Utsumi’s implicit display theory.
One can question whether in fact Ivanko and Pexman (2003) provided an
adequate test of Utsumi (2000). For one, the target sentences differed from one another
and this almost certainly added variability to the data. More importantly, as Ivanko and
Pexman point out, the negative contexts they employed may have been too negative, so
the implicit display of the speakers’ disappointment is not possible and consequently
this makes the weakly negative context a better example of prototypic irony.
The database created here presents us with a stronger way to test Utsumi’s
theory. Recall that participants generated a large number of contexts to ensure that
some statements would likely be perceived as sarcastic. These statements were rated on
a series of dimensions, including negative tension and sarcasm. From this database we
can select items in which the exact same target statement is employed, but in which the
generated contexts differ in rated negative tension. Moreover, the ironic targets can be
chosen as equally sarcastic in that context, as accessed off-line. Choosing targets in this
manner has two advantages. First, any differences in reading times could not be
attributed to differences in target sarcasm (as is the possibility in Ivanko and Pexman)
but would be attributable to negative tension alone. Second, choosing items in this
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manner is a better means of ensuring that Utsumi’s concept of an ironic environment is
satisfied. The key prediction would be that highly sarcastic items within a high negative
tension context would provide a more prototypical ironic environment and hence
should lead to a faster resolution of the sarcastic intent than would the sarcastic items in
a low negative tension context. Providing the same target when used literally would
permit us to see if indeed the literal and sarcastic senses would be accessed equally
rapidly, as suggested by Utsumi’s analysis of Gibbs.
In addition to providing a stronger test of implicit display, a second novel aspect
of our study compared to Ivanko and Pexman (2003) is that we identified the critical
word within each target sentence. The critical word is defined as that point in the
sentence where either a non-sarcastic (literal) or a sarcastic interpretation is invited;
up to that point all the words in the target sentence are the same. It is when reading
the critical word that the reader should be able to start distinguishing the sentence as
either a sarcastic one or a literal one and it is at this point any differences in negative
tension should arise. Much like in Ivanko and Pexman (2003), each target sentence
will be followed by a final sentence, in order to accurately measure any potential
spillover effect.
In summary, we will establish the participants’ reading patterns for the target
utterances to determine if they differ based upon the contexts associated with the
statements. There will be three types of contexts that surround the target sentences:
Literal, Low Negative Tension and High Negative Tension. The target sentences will
be the same regardless of the context. For example, the target utterance “This room
is totally clean” will be placed in a literal context, a sarcastic context with low
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negative tension, and a sarcastic context with high negative tension (see next section
for full examples of each). The level of negativity and the level of sarcasm will be
based upon the ratings established in the earlier ratings task from Chapter 2.
Method
Participants
Forty-five (29 female) undergraduates from the University of Western Ontario
who were enrolled in Introductory Psychology were tested and received 1 course
participation credit in return. The average of the participants was 22.6 years (S.D. =
2.3).
Materials
The stimuli for this experiment included 2 practice items, 21 target items and
4 filler items. Of the 25 test items there were 21 target paragraphs and 4 filler
paragraphs. The 21 target paragraphs were comprised of 7 examples each from the
three types of contexts manipulated here (Literal, sarcastic-Low Negative, and
Sarcastic-High Negative Tension). Participants completed the study on a computer,
using the spacebar on the keyboard the advance the words in each sentence. The
stimuli were programmed using e-prime software and were presented in a word by
word moving windows paradigm. The critical word for each target sentence was
identified and agreed upon to a level of 100% by myself and two other independent
researchers prior to the analysis.

75

The following are examples of the target sentences with the identified critical
words in bold:
“I did great on the test.”
“This room is totally clean.”
“She is a terrific help.”
The 21 target items were taken from the Context Generation Study reported in
Chapter 2. The level of negativity was one of the scales measured in Study 2, in
which participants rated each item on several scales. The high-negative items were
items that received ratings of 5, 6, or 7 on the negativity scale. The low-negative
items were items that received 3, 2, or 1 on the negativity scale. All of these items
though were rated as having a high level of sarcastic meaning by participants in Study
2. In other words, all items were rated by the participants in Study 2 as either a 5, 6
or 7 on the 8-point sarcasm scale. The items for both the low negative and high
negative groups had similar ratings on the other conditions (allusion to failed
expectations; presence of a victim; and pragmatic insincerity). All of these conditions
had a mean of around 5.5 rating on these conditions. Therefore, the only condition
that was manipulated in the sense of being significantly different between the two
contextually negative groups was level of negative tension. Thereby this ensures that
it is the level of negativity being measured rather than other conditions having an
impact on the processing of the target sentences.
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Example items from each context (see Appendix for all items used):
Literal
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again.
Sammy put on some music, rolled up his sleeves and got to work.
After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says,
“This room is totally clean!”
Sammy’s mother closed the door and went downstairs.

Low Negative
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again.
Sammy did not clean his room. Sammy tidied, but his room is still messy.
After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says,
“This room is totally clean!”
Sammy’s mother closed the door and went downstairs.

High Negative
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again.
Sammy's room looked like a tornado had hit it. Sammy went to his room and
just listened to the "Ramones" on his headphones
After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says,
“This room is totally clean!”
Sammy’s mother closed the door and went downstairs.
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Procedure
A standard moving windows procedure was employed. Participants were
instructed to read several short paragraphs on a computer, at a natural pace,
advancing the text word by word by pressing the spacebar on the keyboard provided.
The participants were also informed that after each paragraph they would be asked a
“yes” or “no” question regarding what they just read. The reason for the inclusion of
the “yes or no” question following each paragraph was to ensure that the participant
attended to, and understood, the text.
Each of the paragraphs was presented on the computer monitor as a series of
dashes for each word. Participants pressed the spacebar on the keyboard to reveal
each word in the paragraph and replace the previous word with dashes. After the last
word of the paragraph was read, the “yes” or “no” question regarding that particular
paragraph was presented on screen. The participant pressed the “f” button on the
keyboard for a “yes” response and the “j” button for a “no” response. The paragraphs
were presented in random order. The entire procedure lasted approximately 30
minutes. Ninety-two percent of the “yes or no” questions were answered correctly,
the 8% of items that were answered incorrectly were removed from the analysis.
Results and Discussion
In order to try and clearly establish a reading pattern for each item, seven
regions of reading times were identified and analyzed. The seven word regions
focused on were: the word preceding the target sentence critical word, the critical
word itself, and to examine any spillover effect, regardless of where the critical word
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fell within the target sentence, the five words that followed it were included in the
analysis.
An ANOVA was performed to compare the effect of context on the reading
times of the target sentences embedded within low-negative sarcastic contexts, highnegative sarcastic contexts and literal contexts. The reading patterns for the three
groups across the seven regions are plotted in Figure 1. The overall reading times for
the 3 context groups showed no significant difference. Looking specifically at the 7
critical regions, the three groups of contexts showed no significant difference in
reading times for the word prior to the critical word in the sentence, or the critical
word or the third to fifth word following the critical word. The three groups did,
however, show a significant difference in reading times at the 1st and 2nd word regions
which immediately followed the critical word in the target statements.
First Word after Critical Word
For the first word after the critical word region, the ANOVA showed a main
effect for context, F (2, 43) = 4.039, p < 0.05, with the low-negative items being
significantly slower than the other two types of contexts for the first word following
the critical word. The means for the low-negative contexts were (M = 468.2 msec.,
SD = 183.63 msec.), for the high-negative contexts (M = 432.83, SD = 141.70), and
for the literal contexts (M = 434.36, SD = 158.72). Tukey post-hoc comparisons of
the three groups indicate that the low-negative group (M = 468.2 msec., SD = 183.63
msec.) took significantly longer to read than the literal group (M = 434.36, SD =
158.72) and the high negative group (M = 432.83, SD = 141.70).
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Second Word after Critical Word
For the second word after the critical word region, the ANOVA also showed a
main effect of context F (2, 43) = 6.357, p < 0.05. The low-negative context items
were once again significantly slower than the other two types of context for this
region. The mean for the low-negative contexts were (M = 491.43, SD = 161.42),
compared with high-negative (M = 443.27, SD = 130.68) and the literal (M = 457.97,
SD = 127.69). Tukey post-hoc comparisons of the three groups indicate that the lownegative group (M = 491.43, SD = 161.42) took significantly longer to read than the
literal group (M = 443.27, SD = 130.68) and the high negative group (M = 457.97,
SD = 127.69).
As can be seen in Figure 1, and according to the ANOVA, the reading times for
the three groups return to having no significant differences by the third word after the
target sentence’s critical word. There was no significant difference in reading times
leading up to and including the critical word, showing equal reading time to that
point. The means for the slower reading times following the critical word are
generally indicative of what is called a spill-over effect during online processing.
This spill-over effect is typically explained as an index of the continuing processing
engendered by the critical word. As applied here, the continuing processing would
indicate an attempt by participants to resolve an ambiguity: which of the two
meanings, literal or sarcastic, is more appropriate in the context. Thus participants
here have more difficulty in resolving the sarcastic intend when placed in a low
negative tension context. However, within two words following the critical word the
ambiguity is resolved (i.e. by the fourth word, the spill-over effect passed and the
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reading times were once again comparable for all three groups). This fairly quick
resolution of ambiguity is not surprising given that, off line, all the targets used
ironically were rated as equally sarcastic.
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Figure 1
Reading Times Across the 7 regions for the 3 Types of Context
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In conclusion, these data provide strong support for Utsumi’s (2000) theoretical
position. We now examine these implications for the more general models of
figurative language processing. Recall first the standard pragmatic approach, in which
it is claimed that it is necessary for individuals to process the literal meaning of an
utterance (see Dews & Winner, 1999; Schwoebel, Dews, Winner & Sriniva, 2000),
and hence should be read more rapidly than a non-literal sense. This model is not
supported here given that the exact same items placed in a high negative tension
context and a literal supportive context were read exactly at the same rate. Again,
because the same items were employed in all three experimental conditions the data
cannot be explained by recourse to graded salience theory.
In contrast, these data are supportive of either direct access or constraint
satisfaction models. Recall that the claim of direct access models of figurative
language processing is that the contextual information available prior to the
processing of the target sentence permits the reader access to the figurative meaning
of the statement directly. Constraint satisfaction models propose the weighting of
supportive and disconfirming information determines the speed of resolution. Gibbs’
(1986) claim is that literal language need not have processing priority, a position also
held by constraint satisfaction models. Thus both of these positions are supported
here and these data do not provide a way of disentangling between them.
The data thus in general support the prediction put forth by others (Ivanko &
Pexman, 2003; Utsumi, 2000) that the level of negativity found in the contextual
information impacts the processing times of sarcastic utterances. However, our
findings are directly opposite to that found in Ivanko and Pexman ((2003), given we
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found facilitated reading when negative tension was high whereas the locus of their
positive effects were with low negative contexts. At this point one cannot definitively
explain why these differences in findings occurred, especially given the large
differences in stimuli and procedures employed. We do feel confident however that
what we provide here is a fair and strong test of Utsumi’s position, with target
statements being equally sarcastic and not differing lexically and other known
contextual factors (such as differences in failed expectation or presence of a victim)
being kept constant across scenarios.
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CHAPTER SIX: GENERAL DISCUSSION
The research in this thesis was designed to address two key areas related to the
study of figurative language processing studies. The first question investigated is: “are
there necessary contextual components of sarcastic utterances and if so, what are they?
The second area was to provide an instance of the utility of the database obtained in
answering the first set of questions by asking; “Does negative tension facilitate the
processing of sarcastic statements”
Review of Theoretical Issues
The search for necessary contextual components associated with sarcastic verbal
irony has led to various theories of sarcasm comprehension. Identification and
comprehension of contextual components are central to many of the theories concerning
verbal irony communication (see Implicit Display Model; Pragmatic Insincerity Model;
and the Allusional Pretense Model). Each of these theories predicts different
combinations of components as necessary for the comprehension of verbal irony. The
studies provided in this thesis give a new approach to measuring the presence of these
conditions and provides insight as to whether the presence of these conditions should be
deemed necessary or just probable. We feel this gives us a clear measure as to whether
the conditions predicted by these models are necessary for the successful comprehension
of sarcasm. We find that in fact none of the putative “necessary” conditions are in fact
necessary though each is a probabilistic indicator of sarcastic intent. As such, the data
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presented here is in a general sense supportive of a constraint satisfaction approach to
nonliteral language comprehension.
We study also in depth a theoretical implication derived from the implicit display
theory in an online reading study. The predictions that follow from this theory is that the
level of contextual negativity present in an ironic environment will prime the
reader/listener to anticipate the forthcoming use of sarcastic verbal irony to the point
where successful comprehension takes place in a pattern similar to that of the
comprehension of the literal counterpart. The one previous study in the literature
examining this prediction found negativity to be important, but not in manner predicted
by implicit display theory. We provide here a stronger and better controlled test of the
theory and find support for the predicted role of negative tension. The findings here were
also compatible with direct access models and with constraint satisfaction models but not
with the standard pragmatic approach.
Summary of Results
The primary purpose of Study 1 was to investigate the necessary conditions of a
sarcastic context using a unique experimental approach. Previous studies investigating
the necessary conditions of figurative language comprehension generally provided preconceived contexts. A unique aspect of Study 1 was that the participants themselves
developed the contexts that would successful convey either a meaningful statement or a
statement with a sarcastic meaning. The goal of implementing this task was to try and
establish whether there are certain necessary conditions that need to be present within
sarcastic contexts.
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To determine if the participants were successful in producing meaningful and
sarcastic contexts a blind coder was hired to code the results. The key components of a
sarcastic context based upon the theories are Allusion to failed expectations; Negative
tension; Pragmatic insincerity; and Presence of a victim. The coding on the contexts
created in study 1 gave some support to the predictions put forth by the theories inasmuch
as each of the predicted components was present in the sarcastic contexts. There was also
a significant difference in the contexts created to produce literal statements compared to
those created to produce sarcastic ones. The purpose of Study 2 was to determine
whether the identified and theoretically based components were necessary for creating a
sense of sarcasm or were they only sufficient. We argue that necessity would be obtained
if items rated at the highest levels of the proposed components were found at the highest
levels of sarcasm and absent from the lowest levels of rated sarcasm. In none of the
analyses were all the proposed components found to be necessary. Indeed, often only one
of the so-called necessary components would be found with high levels of sarcasm. We
take these findings as indicating that each of the theoretically identified components are
sufficient or “probable” or likely indicators of sarcastic intent rather than being a
member of a strictly necessary set of conditions for sarcastic comprehension. The
general conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that the conditions that are
claimed to be necessary by the extant psychological theories of sarcasm are often present
in sarcastic contexts but do not appear to be necessary per se.
The overall findings from Study 2 are thus supportive of the constraint
satisfaction model. The constraint satisfaction model proposes that different sources of
information are continually being considered and integrated during cognitive processing
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(see Gibbs, 2001 analysis of Katz and Ferretti’s 2001 proposal). In the constraint
satisfaction view, constraining information interacts to provide the individual with
probabilistic evidence to support one alternative over another, with the competition being
determined when one alternative (e.g. nonliteral or literal) fits best (Gibbs, 2001). The
constraint satisfaction model has previously been applied to other types of figurative
language such as proverbs and metaphors (e.g. Katz & Ferretti, 2001). In the case of the
studies reported here, a constraint satisfaction approach would be that the reader or
listener uses contextual information to determine the probability of alternative meanings
(literal vs. sarcastic). Therefore, according to this view, it is not 1 or 2 specific necessary
conditions that need to be present to determine sarcasm but rather any number of clues
could summate to allow for the reader/listener to weigh one alternative over the other. In
the case of these studies, as long as one of the conditions is strong enough (or a set of
weak ones summate) to push the reader to the figurative or sarcastic meaning alternative,
then that is all that is needed for successful sarcastic comprehension. The concept of
confirmation bias may seem to be present in the structure of the ratings study, due to the
fact that we limited our scales to investigate the presence of proposed necessary
conditions. However, given the open nature of the context completion task, a logical first
step was to find if the proposed necessary conditions were present in those open, sarcastic
contexts. From here, one can investigate any number of factors that may or may not be
involved in the contextual components of a sarcastic utterance, that is one of the strengths
of having a unbiased context generation/completion task to create a testing corpus.
The primary purpose of Study 3 was to investigate the temporal processing of
sarcastic utterances in comparison with literal items using the data base provided in the
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earlier studies. That is, the reading study employed judiciously selected material to
demonstrate the utility of these materials to examine important theoretical questions in
the field. In the illustrative case, the role of negative tension was examined, and
demonstrated comprehension delays (as determined by elevated reading times) for
sarcastic utterances embedded within low negative contextual information. In contrast the
same items embedded in a high negative tension context displayed reading patterns
indistinguishable from the same target sentence used literally. This study not only
provided direct support for one of the predictions of implicit display theory, and
demonstrated additional utility for the database generated here but, arguably, also
provides data compatible again with a constraint satisfaction interpretation of sarcasm
processing.
Constraint Satisfaction
Recall that the constraint satisfaction approach is that comprehension of language
involves constructing a meaning that fits the available information in a way that is
superior to alternative interpretations. The most likely or “best” interpretation of a
statement is the one that provides the most coherent account of what is being
communicated. Understanding an ironic/sarcastic utterance according to this view
requires people to consider different linguistic information that leads to the best fit for
what the speaker is trying to say (Gibbs, 2001).
In terms of the online processing findings from study 3, the constraint satisfaction
could be used to help explain the results. It could be argued that the higher level of
negativity provides the reader with the information that pushes them towards the sarcastic
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meaning being the best fit possible given the situation. Likewise, for the literal items, the
contextual information provided leads the reader towards expecting a literal statement
given the situation and the information. For the low negative items, the contextual
negativity and the accompanying information don’t provide enough of an immediate push
for the reader to expect a sarcastic statement and therefore the reading times for those
target statements were slower than both the high negative items and the literal items for
the key processing regions.
More specifically, it could be argued that the level of negativity found in the
“high” negativity items are at an optimum level to induce the expectation of a sarcastic
statement rather than the literal counterpart. Therefore, constraints against the literal
interpretation are in place and strong enough that the best fit meaning for the reader on
the high negative context items is a sarcastic meaning. The results of the context
preparing the reader for the potential usage of sarcasm is that the sarcastic target
statements are processed at equal rates as literal target statements in the literal context
items.
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
Although the LIWC is not specifically designed to measure differences in
figurative language characteristics, the tool did provide some interesting findings when
utilized to analyze the generated contexts provided by the two instructional groups
(sarcastic vs. open). The objective measure determined that linguistic characteristics
associated with the generated contexts of the two instructional groups differed in 31 of
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the categories. The contexts that invited a sarcastic reading differed from those that did
not in terms of both linguistic variables and those based on judged characteristics.
The main overall LIWC finding was that the words used in the generated sarcastic
contexts differed from the words used in the non-sarcastic contexts and that these
differences were consistent with the explanations put forth by the sarcastic verbal irony
theories investigated. For example the LIWC analysis found that sarcastic contexts were
higher in negative language than their literal counterparts, this is consistent with Utsumi’s
implicit display model.
An interesting finding to come out of the above studies was that by giving
instructions to generate sarcastic contexts led to higher sarcasm ratings even when the
ratings for the necessary components were Low-Low. Why did this occur? Is it possibly
due to a use of different language, language that could be indexed by the LIWC? To
investigate this possibility further we ran the low-low items from both of the instructional
groups (sarcastic and open) through the LIWC measures. Significant differences were
found between the sarcastic and open instruction groups in 16 of the LIWC categories
(see Appendix C). A slightly lower number than the number categories that differed
when we analyzed all of the items produced by both the sarcasm and open instruction
groups but a similar pattern in terms of the types of categories that were significantly
different. There were several key categories that were once again significantly different,
specifically the categories like negations; negative emotions; anger; and sadness. These
were significantly higher in the sarcastic instruction group, compared to the open
instruction. Therefore, the sarcastic instruction participants seemed to be more willing or
more compelled to include negative words in their contexts compared to those
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participants in the open instruction group. It is interesting that once again a level of
negativity seems to be somehow relevant to the contextual make up of sarcastic
contextual information. This difference in use of negative language found by the LIWC
would be a very interesting area to investigate further in future studies.
While it is too early to say that the LIWC can detect sarcasm, it at the very least
did show significant differences between the contextual characteristics used to convey
sarcasm in comparison to the literal counterparts. If this type of objective result was
consistently found and replicated it could be logically theorized that the LIWC could be
modified to accurately detect sarcastic contexts. At the very least, the LIWC findings
from this research show that it could be useful tool in investigating characteristics of the
contexts associated with figurative vs. literal language.
Future Directions
One interesting future project based on this research would be to utilize the
generated contexts into a production task, whereby the participants see the contexts and
must now produce the target statements. This would be more consistent with the
experimental design used by researchers in the area, the caveat being that the contexts
now used in the production task were created by other participants, not the experimenters
themselves. This would be of interest due to the fact that it would mean that both the
accompanying contexts and the statements themselves would be produced by participants
rather than experimenters themselves. It would be interesting to see if the statements
produced by the participants in such a study were consistent with what the theories
surrounding sarcastic verbal irony would predict. More specifically, if participants were
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just given the generated contexts in isolation and asked to produce meaningful responses,
would they produce sarcastic statements? This would be an interesting next phase of
investigation not only to substantiate whether this corpus of generated items could alone
produce sarcastic statements but also because there currently are only a limited number of
sarcasm production studies of any type and this could help fill the gap that currently
exists in the literature.
It would also be interesting to address the findings from Colston (2000) that were
discussed earlier. Recall that Colston claims that intentional violations of Grice’s maxims
can contribute to the listener identifying a statement as having an ironic meaning.
According to Colston (2000), this intentional violation of one or more of the Gricean
conversational maxims, in combination with the portrayal of a contrast between
expectations and reality, the speaker and context are priming the listener to anticipate a
sarcastic utterance. Using the corpus of generated contexts from this research, one could
identify whether violations of any of the Gricean conversation maxims are present and if
so do they contribute to the sarcasm scores. To be consistent with the claims in Colston
(2000), these contextual items that showed an intentional violation of Gricean maxims
would also have to be rated “high” in the category of failed expectations. By taking the
set of contexts produced, it may be possible to investigate if the violation of these
maxims significantly impact the level of sarcasm found in the target statements. It should
be noted that Colston (2000) also cautioned against the viability of a single account of
verbal irony comprehension. It could be argued that the findings from the studies
presented in this paper support that final claim.
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Further investigation into the online processing patterns would also be interesting.
The findings from this study support the claim that level of negativity plays a role in
priming the reader for sarcastic verbal irony, but what other factors could also play a
similar role? Future experiments investigating the potential role of other contextual
components could help further the understanding of what factors shift our processing
patterns of literal and figurative utterances.
It would also be interesting to utilize that data set created by these studies to test
specifically the constraint satisfaction models. This could be done by systematically
manipulating factors that point towards a sarcastic response and those that introduce
ambiguity. The data set produced here could provide the starting point of such an
investigation that hasn’t been present in other investigations focused on the predictions
put forth by the constraint satisfaction model.
Another interesting area of investigation would be to study other populations of
subjects. The majority of the subjects in this study were undergrad students of a certain
age range. Would the findings differ if the subjects were from different age or cultural
populations? This would especially be of interest to those who believe that our usage and
criteria of sarcasm is ever evolving and changing. Perhaps then young undergrad students
have a different sense of sarcasm compared to older non-University students.
Conclusion
The research reported in the current thesis was an early attempt at providing a
more empirically driven understanding of what contextual components are utilized in
the conveying of sarcastic verbal irony. The contradiction between the surface and
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intended meanings associated with sarcastic statements have long motivated
researchers to attempt to clarify how we use this communication technique. The
contextual generation approach was applied in such a way as to help answer some of
the questions researchers of figurative language and the use of sarcastic verbal irony
more specifically. We find that extant theories have identified factors of importance
but not, as claimed necessary factors. Instead the data all point to these factors
working as pointers towards a sarcastic interpretation, none of which by itself is
necessary to create that sense.
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Appendix A: Items Used in the Context Generation Task

1.
Stan and Jennifer had just finished the exam.
Jennifer turns to Stan and says,
“I did great on that test.”
2.
Amanda was volunteering at the toy drive.
Laura says to Paul,
“Amanda sure is a terrific help!”

3.
Chris and Tracy are getting ready to have a picnic.
Tracy turns to Chris and says,
“What a lovely day for a picnic.”

4.
Sheila’s boyfriend Walter arrived home from work.
Sheila says to Walter,
“You are in a pleasant mood today.”
5.
Jean and her husband Frank were leaving the fancy dinner party.
As they were leaving someone said to Frank,
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“You sure were the hit of the party!”
6.
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again.
After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says,
“This room is totally clean!”

7.
Jesse and Mark just found out that Brenda got the job promotion.
Jesse says to Mark,
“She totally deserved it.”

8.
Julie and Cindy arrive at the party.
Cindy says to Julie,
“This is going to be a great party.”

9.
Michael and Sandra are driving through the city.
Michael says to Sandra,
“I love when people use their signals.”

10.
Margaret and Diane were eating at a formal dinner party.
Diane says to Margaret,
“You have wonderful table manners.”
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11.
Harry was helping Diane move her grandfather’s clock.
Diane stops and says to Harry,
“You are really helping me out.”

12.
Maurice was opening another letter from a University in response to grad school
applications.
After reading it, he turned to Tom and said,
“Looks like I am every school’s first choice.”

13.
Sally came home from a job interview.
Sally says to Ian,
“This job has absolutely the best pay.”

14.
Alfred and Maggie decide to eat at a new restaurant they have heard a lot about.
During the meal Maggie says to Alfred,
“What incredible food they serve.”

15.
Harry and Ron were waiting at the baggage claim for their luggage.
Ron says to Harry,
“That was a fantastic flight.”
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16.
Larry made Sally a stew for dinner.
Sally took a bite and said to Larry,
“You sure are a great cook.”

17.
Paul’s boss walked by his office while he was sitting at his desk.
His Boss stopped and said,
“Don’t work so hard.”

18.
Ken went to a new barber for a haircut.
After he was done Ken said to the barber,
“Thanks for a great haircut.”

19.
Chris and John waited in line 3 hours to see a movie.
After the movie John said to Chris,
“That was worth waiting for.”

20.
Anne promised to keep her party dress clean.
When she arrived home her mom said,
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“Thanks for keeping so clean.”

21.
George and Betty decided to go to a birthday party.
When they arrived Betty said to George,
“It is really crowded in here.”
22.
Stan and Jennifer had just finished the exam.
Jennifer turns to Stan and says,
“I did great on that test.”
23.
Chris and Tracy are getting ready to have a picnic.
Tracy turns to Chris and says,
“What a lovely day for a picnic.”
24.
Maurice was opening another letter from a University in response to grad school
applications.
After reading it, he turned to Tom and said,
“Looks like I am every school’s first choice.”
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Appendix B: LIWC Analysis for Generated Contexts
L.I.W.C. factors that were significantly different but did not reach 3% cutoff.

Group
Factor

Sarcastic

Open

F

Family

0.12

0.43

9.35*

Friends

0.12

0.32

8.85*

Sadness

1.67

0.20

88.40**

Anger

0.91

0.41

8.38*

Anxiety

0.64

0.32

4.08*

Certainty

0.88

1.61

20.50**

Feel

0.94

1.51

12.69**

Bio

2.93

2.28

7.88*

Body

0.96

0.62

9.83*

Sexual

0.04

0.20

7.06*
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Ingest

1.61

1.24

6.90*

Motion

1.71

2.78

15.84*

Money

1.03

0.61

10.87*

Religion

0.03

0.11

8.11*

Filler

0.38

0.18

4.46*

* indicates significant at .05 level; ** indicates significant at the .01 level
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Appendix C: L.I.W.C. factors that were significantly different in Low-Low,
Instructional Analysis
Group
Factor

Sarcastic

Open

F

8.8

10.4

9.66*

5.9

7.6

12.14*

3.1

5.3

30.39**

11.3

9.6

10.49*

Past

8.7

10.5

10.33*

Present

6.6

4.4

20.94*

Prepositions

9.7

11.9

15.5*

Negations

3.9

1.6

73.95**

Social

10.1

12.2

10.45*

Pronouns

Personal
Pronouns
3rd Person
Singular
Auxiliary
Verbs

Processes
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3.2

6.4

56.23*

4.8

1.4

71.4**

Sadness

1.6

0.3

26.5**

Causation

0.8

1.2

4.35*

Certainty

0.9

1.6

11.95*

Exclusive

3.1

1.4

30.35**

Feeling

0.9

1.8

14.84*

Positive
Emotions
Negative
Emotions

* indicates significant at .05 level; ** indicates significant at the .01 level
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Appedix D: Items Used in the Online Processing Task
Example High/Strong negative tension:
Jennifer fell asleep the night before the big exam.
Stan and Jennifer had just finished the exam.
Jennifer knew she had not answered one answer properly.

Jennifer turns to Stan and says,
“I did great on that test.”

Example Low/Weak Negative tension:
Stan and Jennifer had just finished the exam.
Walking out, Jennifer began to regret not studying.

Jennifer turns to Stan and says,
“I did great on that test.”

Example of Literal:
Jennifer had been studying for weeks.
Stan and Jennifer had just finished the exam.
Jennifer feels like she did well.
“I did great on that test.”

Literal
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again.
Sammy put on some music, rolled up his sleeves and got to work.
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After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says,
“This room is totally clean!”
Sammy’s mother closed the door and went downstairs.

Low Negative
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again.
Sammy did not clean his room. Sammy tidied, but his room is still messy.
After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says,
“This room is totally clean!”
Sammy’s mother closed the door and went downstairs.

High Negative
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again.
Sammy's room looked like a tornado had hit it. Sammy went to his room and just listened
to the "Ramones" on his headphones
After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says,
“This room is totally clean!”
Sammy’s mother closed the door and went downstairs.
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